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INTRODUCTION 
After enrolling in the Illinois Medicaid program, the public health 
insurance program for poor and disabled Americans, Tessinia Rodri-
guez and Elissa Bassler both sought a physician referral from the 
Medicaid hotline.1  The hotline gave Rodriguez the names of approx-
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imately ten doctors, all of whom practiced more than thirty miles 
from her home; not one accepted Medicaid.2  Bassler received the 
names of eight doctors, none of whom accepted Medicaid.3  Benita 
Branch had difficulty finding a doctor to treat her children on Medi-
caid, and when she finally did, the doctor did not schedule appoint-
ments.4  Branch had to bring her children into the doctor’s office and 
take a number, often waiting more than an hour—and sometimes 
several hours—before being seen.5  Sara Mauk was able to find a doc-
tor that would see her daughter; however, the doctor required Medi-
caid patients to wait until after all privately insured patients had been 
seen.6 
Over sixty million low-income individuals rely on Medicaid for 
their health insurance coverage.7  The majority of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries are parents and children.8  The most medically needy and cost-
ly are the elderly and disabled.9  For both groups, however, Medicaid 
is intended to be a lifeline to essential health and medical care.10  Alt-
hough Medicaid patients have freedom of choice to select among par-
 
 1. Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92-C-1982, 2004 WL 1878332, 
at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004) (finding that the children in Cook County, Illinois 
were unable to secure Medicaid covered care, in part because of low reimbursement 
rates).   
 2. Id. at *18.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at *19. 
 7. See MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMMISSION (MACPAC), 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 26 (2011) [hereinafter 
MACPAC REPORT], (noting that today, the Medicaid program “finances health cov-
erage for an estimated 68 million people, about half of whom are children”).  In 2009, 
Congress created the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission 
(MACPAC) specifically to study and make recommendations on beneficiary access 
to care in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).   
 8. See MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 29. 
 9. Id. at 30.  Disabled individuals and individuals age sixty-five and older make 
up less than one-third of the Medicaid population, yet account for about two-thirds of 
Medicaid spending. Id. 
 10. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the 
“Equal Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 675 (2006) (citing Medicare and 
Medicaid, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong. 57 (1970) 
(statement of Honorable John G. Veneman, Under Secretary, Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare) [hereinafter Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doc-
tors] (testifying that providing “mainstream medical care for all the people of this 
country” was “[t]he whole purpose of the 1965 act”)). 
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ticipating providers,11 physicians also have freedom of choice to par-
ticipate in Medicaid.12  Congress has recognized that “without ade-
quate payment levels, it is simply unrealistic to expect physicians to 
participate in the [Medicaid] program.”13  In fact, low reimbursement 
rates have led many physicians and particularly specialists to stop 
treating Medicaid patients.14 
Despite the well-established correlation between Medicaid provid-
er payments and physicians’ willingness to treat Medicaid recipients, 
states continue to make budget-driven cuts to their Medicaid provider 
reimbursement rates.15  Although the economy is improving slowly, 
states still face a dire fiscal situation and growing Medicaid costs are a 
key contributor to state budget gaps.16  As a result, nearly every state 
has proposed or implemented cuts to Medicaid in their 2011–2012 
budget year, reducing payments to doctors, hospitals and other health 
care providers that treat Medicaid patients.17  As the stories of 
 
 11. The Medicaid Act’s “freedom of choice” provision requires states to ensure 
that “any individual eligible for medical assistance . . . may obtain such assistance 
from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform 
the service or services required . . . who undertakes to provide him such services . . . .” 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2006). 
 12. See BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION 
AND FINANCE 562 (3d ed. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)). 
 13. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1989, H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 
390 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2116. 
 14. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-624, MEDICAID AND CHIP: 
MOST PHYSICIANS SERVE CHILDREN BUT HAVE DIFFICULTY REFERRING THEM FOR 
SPECIALTY CARE 18 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11624.pdf.  GAO esti-
mates that for providers who choose not to participate in Medicaid and CHIP, 95% 
are influenced by low provider reimbursement rates. Id.  
 15. Public scientific studies consistently confirm that access to health care and 
dental services is generally poor for Medicaid recipients when compared to access 
enjoyed by the privately insured population, whose provider reimbursement rates are 
notably higher. See, e.g., Joanna Bisgaier et al., Disparities in Child Access to Emer-
gency Care for Acute Oral Injury, 127 PEDIATRICS 1428 (2011); Joanna Bisgaier & 
Karin V. Rhodes, Auditing Access to Specialty Care for Children with Public Insur-
ance, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2324 (2011); Medical Access Study Group, Access of 
Medicaid Recipients to Outpatient Care, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426 (1994); Asheley 
C. Skinner & Michelle L. Mayer, Effects of Insurance Status on Children’s Access to 
Specialty Care: A Systemic Review of the Literature, 7 BMC HEALTH SERV. RES. 194 
(2007). 
 16. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES: AN UPDATE OF STATE FISCAL CONDITIONS 28 (2011), http 
://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/FSS1111.PDF.  
 17. See VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNIN-
SURED, MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES: A LOOK AT MEDICAID SPEND-
ING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 7 (2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
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Tessinia Rodriguez, Elissa Bassler, Benita Branch, and Sara Mauk 
exemplify, cuts to state Medicaid programs can make it difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, for Medicaid patients to find a doctor who will 
see them.18  Cuts in reimbursement rates for providers can and have 
resulted in dramatic consequences for Medicaid patients.19  For ex-
ample, in a highly publicized case, a hospital in Clare, Michigan 
closed its obstetrical unit in direct response to the state’s inadequate 
Medicaid payments.20 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 to ensure that poor and disa-
bled Americans had access to “mainstream” and often life-saving 
medical services.21  The goal was to provide beneficiaries with mean-
ingful access to medical services, not merely a Medicaid card.22  Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Medicaid Act) gives 
individuals who meet Medicaid eligibility requirements a legal right 
to have payments made to their providers for their needed medical 
services.23  The federal government and states jointly fund services 
rendered to Medicaid-eligible individuals.24  States receive federal 
 
8248.pdf.  A total of thirty-nine states restricted provider rates in FY 2011 and forty-
six states reported plans to do so in FY 2012. Id. 
 18. See Moncrieff, supra note 10, at 674 (noting that although cutting providers’ 
reimbursements may seem like the best option, it causes providers to refuse Medicaid 
patients, “leaving program recipients with a welfare entitlement that buys them noth-
ing”); see also Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92-C-1982, 2004 WL 
1878332, at *43 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004) (finding that “the rates Illinois Medicaid 
pays simply do not entice medical providers to participate in Medicaid”). 
 19. See Shannon McCaffrey, State Medicaid Cuts Hit Patients, Doctors, FISCAL 
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/12/27/AP-Medi 
caid-Cuts-Hit-Patients-Doctors.aspx#page1 (noting that Arizona, for a time, elimi-
nated life-saving transplants for Medicaid patients, and hospital officials in the state 
blame at least one death on the halt in coverage); see also Robert Pear, As Number 
of Medicaid Patients Goes Up, Their Benefits Are About To Drop, N.Y. TIMES, June 
15, 2011, at A24.  
 20. See Kevin Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients are Abandoned, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at A1. 
 21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 22. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-213, at 66 (1965) (noting that Congress’ purpose in es-
tablishing the Medicaid program was to provide comprehensive health benefits to 
“the most needy in the country”). 
 23. See ELICIA J. HERZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS) 7-5700, 
MEDICAID: A PRIMER 1–4 (2012) (listing who must receive Medicaid services from 
the state). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006); see 42 C.F.R. § 430 (2011) (explaining that Medicaid 
is jointly funded by the states and federal government and administered by the 
states).  
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matching payments for all state spending on covered services.25  To 
receive federal payments, however, states must implement their Med-
icaid programs consistent with minimum federal requirements.26  For 
example, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) requires states to adopt pay-
ment rates that “are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care 
and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that 
such care and services are available to the general population in the 
geographic area.”27  This provision is often referred to as the “equal 
access provision.”28  Today, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), a subdivision of the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), is charged with the administra-
tion of the Medicaid program at the federal level.29  CMS oversees 
state Medicaid programs to ensure that they comply with the mini-
mum federal requirements promulgated under the Medicaid Act, in-
cluding the equal access provision.30 
This Note discusses Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to health care in 
the context of the federal Medicaid Act’s equal access provision.31  
After examining state Medicaid payment policies and legal challenges 
to state rate cuts specifically, this Note finds that states have failed to 
comply with and the federal government has failed to enforce the 
equal access provision of the Medicaid Act.32  This Note concludes 
 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006) (defining services that qualify as “medical as-
sistance” and therefore receive funding). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006).  State participation in the program is voluntary, but 
states that choose to participate must comply with the provisions of the Medicaid Act 
and its implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.0–456.725, which set the pro-
gram’s parameters and establish its basic requirements. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 301 (1980).  
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) additionally requires that a state provide “meth-
ods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and ser-
vices available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against unneces-
sary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent 
with efficiency, economy, and quality of care.” 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). 
 29. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF 
HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND REGULATION 186 (2004); see CMS, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 30. See HALL, supra note 29, at 186. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). 
 32. Although this Note brings to light many of the shortfalls of the Medicaid pro-
gram, it is not intended to suggest that Medicaid has not been extremely beneficial. 
In fact, shortcomings aside, Medicaid has provided health insurance to millions of 
low-income Americans and markedly improved the position of the poor in the Amer-
ican health care system. See, e.g., JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE’S MEDICINE: 
MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY CARE SINCE 1965 xvii (2006) (“Medicaid, alt-
hough imperfect, has eased access, provided prophylaxis, and delivered procedures. 
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with policy recommendations that will enhance CMS’ oversight of 
states’ payment policies, thereby ensuring that Medicaid beneficiaries 
have access to meaningful care, as required by the Medicaid Act. 
Part I of this Note reviews the history and structure of Medicaid 
and describes the Medicaid provider payment system in the context of 
the requirements, history, and rationale of the equal access provision 
of the Medicaid Act.  Part II analyzes administrative tools available to 
CMS to ensure state compliance with the equal access process, high-
lighting the limitations of the administrative system.  Part III propos-
es alternative administrative mechanisms by which CMS could hold 
states accountable where they fail to adopt rates that are adequate to 
ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have sufficient access to care, as 
required by the equal access provision. 
I.  DECONSTRUCTING MEDICAID 
To provide the necessary background and context for the discus-
sion of the limitations of the current Medicaid enforcement scheme 
discussed in Part II, this Part describes the federal-state partnership in 
which Medicaid is grounded, providing an overview of both the de-
velopment and operation of the Medicaid program.  First, this Part 
explains Medicaid’s current role in the American health care system 
and how it grew from a small welfare program to a significant health 
insurer.  Next, this Part focuses on the operation of the Medicaid pro-
gram, specifically, looking at how the state and federal governments 
interact to administer state Medicaid programs and set provider re-
imbursement rates.  This Part concludes with a description of litiga-
tion challenging Medicaid provider payment policies. 
A. The History and Development of Medicaid 
Enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Medi-
caid was created to provide medical care to the poor, blind, and disa-
bled.33  When first created, most government officials and legislators 
viewed Medicaid as a welfare program, not health insurance, as Med-
 
Despite its underfunding and large eligibility gaps, Medicaid has brought the rates of 
poor people’s interactions with private doctors and hospitals up to, and sometimes 
beyond, the rates posted by the middle class. And despite bizarrely inconsistent re-
imbursement rates among the various states, Medicaid has improved the life expec-
tancy for all America’s poor, regardless of residence.”).  
 33. See id. at 48. 
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icaid eligibility was tied to cash assistance.34  Since its inception, wel-
fare (cash assistance to the poor) has faced forceful opposition, and 
Medicaid did not escape the welfare stigma.35  Significantly, Medicaid 
was “de-linked” from welfare in 1996.36  The 1996 Welfare Reform 
Act ended the federal entitlement to cash benefits for the poor by 
creating separate welfare programs administered by each state.37  Eli-
gibility for welfare now had no bearing on eligibility for Medicaid.38  
By “de-linking” Medicaid and cash assistance, states had greater flex-
ibility in their Medicaid decision-making and Medicaid began to shift 
out of the welfare frame and into the health insurance frame.39 
Today, Medicare and Medicaid are the two largest components of 
public health care spending in the United States.40  Medicare is a fed-
eral program that provides health coverage to about forty-seven mil-
lion Americans, primarily individuals age sixty-five and older but also 
including several million younger adults with permanent disabilities.41  
Medicaid provides health coverage and long-term care services and 
supports for sixty million low-income Americans including nearly 
thirty million low-income children, eleven million persons with disa-
bilities, and six million elderly individuals.42  Medicare is financed en-
 
 34. See id. at 111 (Medicaid “was essentially a welfare program, not an insurance 
program, and thus needed to be tightly wedded to existing welfare programs within 
the statute bureaucracies, lest eligibility standards diverge.”).  Medicaid was housed 
within the existing state welfare departments and Congress described Medicaid bene-
ficiaries as “recipients.” Id. at 48–49.  By contrast, Medicare beneficiaries were re-
ferred to as “beneficiaries,” the usual term describing holders of private insurance 
policies. Id. at 49. 
 35. See Saundra K. Schneider, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Medicaid, 28 
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 161, 163 (1998). 
 36. See id. at 169. 
 37. See NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, ISSUE BRIEF: WELFARE REFORM AND ITS 
IMPACT ON MEDICAID: AN UPDATE 5–6 (Feb. 26, 1999), http://www.nhpf.org/library/ 
issue-briefs/IB732_WelfRef&Mcaid_2-26-99.pdf. Immediately following the enact-
ment of welfare reform, Medicaid enrollments declined. But the initial drop in Medi-
caid was soon followed by remarkable increases in the Medicaid population. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See JENNIFER JENSEN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, GOVERNMENT 
SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND PROGRAMS: A DATA BRIEF 2 (2008) (ex-
plaining that 77% of public funds allocated to health spending in 2007 was spent on 
Medicare and Medicaid).  
 41. See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 1 (2010), http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/upload/7334-04.pdf. 
 42. MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.  
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tirely with federal money; by contrast, the federal and state govern-
ments jointly fund Medicaid.43 
In 2002, Medicaid surpassed Medicare for the first time as the larg-
est government health care program, providing benefits to more peo-
ple than any other public or private insurance program.44  Nationally, 
Medicaid accounts for roughly 17% of all health care spending and 
7% of the total federal budget.45  During the current economic reces-
sion, the number of Medicaid enrollees has grown as the number of 
Americans affected by loss of work or declining income has risen.46  
For federal fiscal year 2010, Medicaid spending totaled $406 billion, 
with a federal share of $274 billion and a state share of $132 billion.47  
For states, Medicaid represents a major budget item and the largest 
source of federal revenues.48  The majority of spending is to reim-
burse hospital, physician, and other acute care providers, as well as 
nursing home and other long-term care services.49 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted 
in 2010, will significantly expand the Medicaid program in 2014, re-
quiring that states provide Medicaid coverage to all non-disabled 
adults under age 65 with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty 
level.50  As a result of expanded eligibility, Medicaid is expected to 
 
 43. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID REIM-
BURSEMENT AND FINANCE OVERVIEW, available at https://www.cms.gov/medicaidrf/; 
see also infra Part I.B. 
 44. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 43. 
 45. VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FOUNDATION, THE CRUNCH 
CONTINUES: MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY IN THE MIDST OF A RE-
CESSION—RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY FOR STATE FIS-
CAL YEARS 2009 AND 2010 9 (2009), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7985.pdf.  
 46. Since the start of the recession more than seven million people have enrolled 
in Medicaid. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TOP 5 THINGS TO 
KNOW ABOUT MEDICAID Fig. 8 (2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8162.pdf.   
 47. MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 38. 
 48. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KEY QUESTIONS ABOUT 
MEDICAID AND ITS ROLE IN STATE/FEDERAL BUDGETS AND HEALTH REFORM 1–2 
(Jan. 2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8139.pdf.  Densely populated states 
spend significantly more money on Medicaid than smaller states.  Although differ-
ences in population account for some of this variation, payments per enrollee also 
vary widely by state. Id. 
 49. See id. at 2 (“In fiscal year 2009 . . . about three-fifths of federal and state 
Medicaid spending was on hospital, physician, drugs, and other acute care services; 
about a third was on nursing home and other long-term care services.”).  For exam-
ple, Medicaid accounts for 17% of all hospital spending. Medicaid Cost-Savings Op-
portunities, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Feb. 3, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110203tech.html. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 109 (2010).  Un-
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cover up to eighty million Americans by 2019.51  It will be the largest 
payer of health care in the United States, providing health insurance 
to about sixty million Americans.52  Although the ACA dramatically 
expands Medicaid eligibility, it does little to assure that Medicaid 
beneficiaries have access to the care and services they require.53  
Therefore, this Note argues that HHS, through CMS, must implement 
additional administrative remedies to ensure state compliance with 
the equal access provision, which will in turn ensure that Medicaid 
beneficiaries have access to medical care and services “at least to the 
extent” they are available to the “general population” in the same ge-
ographic area.54 
B. The Operation of Medicaid: A Federal and State Partnership 
Medicaid is entangled in a complex web of relationships between 
the federal government and the states.  As noted above, the federal 
and state governments jointly fund Medicaid.55  In return for agreeing 
to implement Medicaid according to federal standards, all states re-
ceive “federal financial participation” (FFP) for their Medicaid ex-
penditures based on their Federal Medical Assistance Percentage 
(FMAP).56  In other words, the higher a state’s FMAP, the higher the 
 
der the ACA, starting in 2014, twenty million more people will become eligible to en-
roll in Medicaid. Andrea M. Sisko, et al., National Health Spending Projections: The 
Estimated Impact of Reform Through 2019, HEALTH AFFAIRS 5 (Oct. 2010).  Provi-
sions of the ACA, however, have been challenged, and on November 14, 2011, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider several questions relating to the consti-
tutionality of the law. See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235, 1241 
(11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, No. 11-393, 2011 WL 5515162 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011), 
cert granted, No. 11-398, 2011 WL 5515164 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011), cert. granted in part, 
No. 11-400, 2011 WL 5515165 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011).  Among other questions for re-
view, the Court will decide whether the Medicaid expansion amounts to an unconsti-
tutional coercion of state governments. See N.C. Aizenman, Supreme Court’s 
Planned Review of Health-Care Law Shocks Medicaid Advocates, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/court-
review-of-medicaid-expansion-could-have-massive-
consequences/2011/11/15/gIQA1LwkSN_story.html (explaining that supporters of the 
law were surprised and disappointed that the Supreme Court agreed to review the 
constitutionality of the extension of Medicaid to cover a greater number of the poor). 
 51. Sisko, supra note 50, at 4. 
 52. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 41, at 1. 
 53. See Bisgaier & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 2324 (“Health care reform has ex-
panded eligibility to public insurance without fully addressing concerns about ac-
cess.”). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006). 
 55. See supra note 44. 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006) (describing the amount of federal funds to which a 
state is “entitled”). 
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percentage of a state’s Medicaid costs borne by the federal govern-
ment.57  A state’s FMAP is based on its per capita income, with no 
state receiving less than 50%.58 Mississippi has the highest FMAP at 
74%, meaning that for every twenty-six cents Mississippi spends on 
Medicaid, the federal government contributes seventy-four cents.59  
Nationally, the average federal share of Medicaid (i.e. FMAP) is 57% 
and the states’ share is 43%.60 
In order to receive federal matching dollars, the Medicaid Act re-
quires states to implement their Medicaid programs according to fed-
eral standards laid out in the law and corresponding regulations.61  
For example, states are required to abide by the statutory eligibility 
criteria.62  Although states must operate within federal guidelines, the 
Medicaid Act and its regulations provide states a degree of flexibility 
in determining eligibility standards, benefits packages, and provider 
payment rates.63  As discussed in more detail below, a state must 
submit a State Plan Amendment (SPA) to CMS whenever it makes a 
“material change” to its Medicaid program.64  CMS then reviews the 
SPA to ensure that the State is complying with the Medicaid law and 
regulations.65  Therefore, even though states retain some flexibility in 
setting provider reimbursement methodologies, all payment policies 
must be set forth in the state’s Medicaid plan and any payment 
changes must be reflected in a SPA.66 
 
 57. See generally ALISON MITCHELL & EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7-5700, MEDICAID: THE FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
PERCENTAGE (FMAP) (2012).  
 58. Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditure, 75 Fed. Reg. 
69082, 69082 (Nov. 10, 2010). 
 59. Id. at 69083. 
 60. Id.  
 61. See MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.   
 62. Enrollment is based on categorical and financial eligibility and state residen-
cy/citizenship. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 63. Id.; see Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 675–76 
(noting that even as the list of federal requirements has grown, “states still retain a 
large degree of flexibility in determining requirements for eligibility, in establishing 
the scope of benefits covered, and in setting rates for reimbursement”).  
 64. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(ii) (2011). 
 65. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2011) (“The State plan contains all information necessary 
for CMS to determine whether the plan can be approved to serve as a basis for Fed-
eral financial participation (FFP) in the State program.”); see Alexander v. Choate, 
469 U.S. 287, n.1 (1985) (explaining that state must agree to comply with the federal 
Medicaid law to receive federal funds).  
 66. The CMS website explains that CMS reviews State plan amendment reim-
bursement methodologies for services provided under the State plan for consistency 
with Section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act and other applicable federal 
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1. State Medicaid Plans 
The Secretary of HHS, through CMS, monitors state Medicaid 
programs to ensure that states implement their Medicaid programs 
consistent with minimum federal requirements promulgated under 
the federal Medicaid Act.67  To participate in Medicaid, a state must 
submit a “plan for medical assistance”68 that explains how it will 
spend its funds.69  Although participation is optional, all states have 
elected to participate in the Medicaid program for the past thirty 
years, and therefore have submitted State Plans that were originally 
approved by CMS.70 
A state must file a SPA with CMS when it seeks to enact a 
“[m]aterial change [] in State law, organization, or policy” to the state 
Medicaid program.71  The SPA must include a comprehensive written 
statement containing all information necessary for CMS to determine 
whether the plan can be approved.72  CMS reviews SPAs to ensure 
that any changes to state Medicaid programs comply with a long list 
of federal statutory and regulatory requirements.73  If the State Plan 
with the proposed amendment satisfies these criteria, it is approved 
and the states may receive FFP for any new Medicaid expenditures 
consistent with the SPA.74 
When a State submits a proposed SPA to CMS, CMS has ninety 
days to determine whether the amendment complies with the Medi-
caid Act.75  If CMS does not respond within the ninety days, the 
amendment is deemed approved and FFP for any additional Medi-
 
statutes and regulations. Medicaid Reimbursement & Finance, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidRF/. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2006) (“The Secretary shall approve any plan which ful-
fills the conditions specified in subsection (a) . . . .”).    
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. 
 69. See Community Health Center v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 
2002) (“States electing to participate in Medicaid must submit a plan detailing how 
the State will expend its funds.”).  At the state level, Medicaid is administered by a 
single state agency charged with establishing and complying with a state Medicaid 
plan that must comply with federal Medicaid law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5); 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 430.10, 431.10 (2011).  
 70. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 48, at 1. 
 71. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii) 
 72. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10. 
 73. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.15(a)–(b). 
 74. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2)(ii). 
 75. 42 C.F.R. § 430.16(a)(1).  
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caid spending is forthcoming.76  If CMS asks for more information, 
the clock stops until CMS receives the requested information.77  After 
receiving all requested information, CMS has another ninety days to 
make a decision.78  If CMS rejects a proposed SPA, the State is enti-
tled to petition CMS for reconsideration of the issue, and CMS is re-
quired to hold a hearing.79 
In addition and distinct from the SPA approval process, the Secre-
tary of HHS, through CMS, has discretion to withhold FFP from a 
State if the State does not act in compliance with an approved plan, or 
if an approved plan no longer complies with the requirements of the 
Medicaid Act.80  Prior to withholding funding, CMS must initiate a 
compliance action against a State, alleging that the State has failed to 
abide by Medicaid rules and regulations.81  When this occurs, CMS 
must notify the state that  
no further payments will be made to the State (or that payments will 
be made only for those portions or aspects of the program that are 
not affected by the noncompliance), and [t]hat the total or partial 
withholding will continue until the Administrator is satisfied that the 
State’s plan and practice are, and will continue to be, in compliance 
with Federal requirements.82   
Federal funding may resume only when CMS is “satisfied that there 
will no longer be [a] failure to comply” with the requirements im-
posed by the Medicaid Act.83 
 
 76. Id.; see New York ex rel. Perales v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 776, 779–80 (2d Cir. 
1987) (finding that even if amendment to New York’s Medicaid plan were “deemed 
accepted” by failure of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to reject 
amendment until ninety days after amendment’s submission, the Secretary had con-
tinuing authority to determine approvability of state Medicaid plans; therefore, Sec-
retary’s official rejection of amendment would serve to revoke any implied ac-
ceptance of amendment by Secretary’s delay in officially rejecting the amendment).  
 77. 42 C.F.R. § 430.16(a)(2). 
 78. Id.  
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2006).   
 80. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; 42 C.F.R. § 430.35(a); see also CENTER FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT & FINANCE, http://www.cms.gov 
/MedicaidRF/ (ensuring that [FFP] for the Medicaid program is paid consistently with 
Federal requirements by reviewing State funding requests and claims); Letter from 
Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, Center for Medicaid & State Operations, 
Health Care Financing Admin., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to State Med-
icaid Directors (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SMD010201.pdf 
(explaining that the agency will not provide federal funds for any state plan amend-
ment until the agency approves the amendment).  
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; 42 C.F.R. § 430.35(a), (d). 
 82. 42 C.F.R. § 430.35(d)(1)(i)–(ii).  
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.  
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Medicaid regulations provide that if a State is dissatisfied with a 
CMS final determination on a SPA or compliance with Federal re-
quirements, the State may file a petition for judicial review.84  The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) additionally provides for judi-
cial review of final agency action.85  The APA permits any person ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action to seek judicial review 
of the lawfulness of that action.86  The reviewing court is required to 
set aside agency action if it finds it to be “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”87  A fi-
nal determination by CMS regarding the approval of a SPA or a 
State’s compliance with Federal requirements must be upheld if it was 
based upon a permissible construction of the relevant Medicaid 
state.88 
2. Provider Payment Rates 
A SPA must be submitted to CMS for approval and must describe 
the policies and methods to be used to set payment rates for each 
type of service included in the State Plan.89  Although States have 
flexibility in determining their provider payment policies, including 
their reimbursement rates, they must receive approval from CMS.90  
 
 84. 42 C.F.R. § 430.38(a). 
 85. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).  
 86. 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 87. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“[A]n agency rule [is] arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that 
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”). 
 88. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  “[If] a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.” Id. at 843.  Chevron deference is required “when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force 
of law, and . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  
The Supreme Court has also held that informal agency interpretations of a statute 
such as those contained in an opinion letter, policy statement, agency manuals, or en-
forcement guidelines, are not entitled to Chevron-style deference. Christensen v. 
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000); cf. Cal. Hosp. Ass’n v. Douglas, No. CV 
11-9078 CAS, 2011 WL 6820229, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2011) (holding that Secre-
tary’s approval of SPA is not entitled to Chevron deference). 
 89. 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.10, 447.201(b) (2011).   
 90. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.  In addition to securing federal 
approval for reimbursement rates and rate cuts, one commentator notes that Section 
30(A) of the Medicaid Act sets a ceiling and a floor on payments.  That is, “payments 
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CMS bases its approval on the state Medicaid agency’s assurances 
that the State has complied with all Medicaid payment law and regu-
lations.91 
CMS typically has approved Medicaid payment rate reductions,92 
although Medicaid reimbursement rates historically have been nota-
bly less than those of private payers and Medicare.93  On average, 
States pay Medicaid providers about 72% of what Medicare pays, 
which is already below market rate.94  Many providers lose money for 
each Medicaid beneficiary they treat, as reimbursements are on aver-
age considerably lower than the costs of providing Medicaid benefi-
ciaries with care.95  For example, CMS recently approved a 5% rate 
 
[can] be no more than the cost of providing medical services efficiently and economi-
cally, but no less than the cost of providing recipients with access to the same quality 
of services to which private-market and Medicare patients have access.” See 
Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 677. 
 91. 42 C.F.R. § 447.256(a)(2); see Jon Donenberg, Note, Medicaid and Benefi-
ciary Enforcement: Maintaining State Compliance with Federal Availability Re-
quirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1506 (2008) (“Given the statutory enumeration of 
the grounds upon which states can modify their Medicaid programs through the SPA 
process, approval of amendments is generally straightforward and fairly predictable. 
In some cases, CMS even provides ‘preprint’ sheets—skeleton forms that state ad-
ministrators can fill in . . . .”).  
 92. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why 
(and How) it Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2340 (2010) 
[hereinafter Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault] (noting that CMS has failed to 
serve a “gatekeeping function” and instead, CMS tends to “rubber-stamp” state 
plans); Mary K. Reinhart, Arizona Medicaid Cut Approved by Feds, ARIZ. REPUB-
LIC (Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles/2011/ 
11/25/20111125arizona-medicaid-cut-approved-by-feds.html. 
 93. See TRICIA M. MCGINNIS, JULIA BERENSON & NIKKI HIGHSMITH, CENTER 
FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC., INCREASING PRIMARY CARE RATES, MAXIMIZ-
ING MEDICAID ACCESS AND QUALITY 2 (2011) (noting that “Medicaid has long reim-
bursed physician services at a lower rate than private payers and Medicare,” which 
discourages physician participation); Stephen Zuckerman et al., Trends: Changes in 
Medicaid Physician Fees, 1998–2003: Implications for Physician Participation, 4 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 374, 379 (2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/ 
06/23/hlthaff.w4.374.full.pdf+html (noting that nationwide, the average Medicaid re-
imbursement rate is 69% of Medicare reimbursement). 
 94. Phil Galewitz, A Dozen States Slice Medicaid Payments to Doctors, Hospi-
tals, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 6, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/ 
2011/July/06/states-cut-medicaid-payments-doctors-hospitals.aspx.  Although differ-
ent, both Medicare and Medicaid payment systems are prospective rather than retro-
spective.  These prospective payment systems set a fixed rate in advance that does 
not vary according to the nature or extent of treatment given. See Hall, supra note 
29, at 300.  
 95. See WILL FOX & JOHN PICKERING, MILLIMAN, HOSPITAL & PHYSICIAN COST 
SHIFT: PATIENT LEVEL COMPARISON OF MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND COMMERCIAL 
PAYERS 6 (2008), http://publications.milliman.com/research/health-rr/pdfs/hospital-
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reduction for Arizona health care providers, which means Arizona 
hospitals will now be paid 70% of what it costs to care for a Medicaid 
patient.96  Many providers have left the Medicaid program due to in-
adequate payment rates.97  So long as state Medicaid programs un-
derpay doctors and hospitals, the poor will face major barriers in ac-
cessing essential health care under the program, and will likely suffer 
worse health outcomes as a result.98 
Prior to 1980, Medicaid and Medicare rates were determined based 
on a “reasonable cost” methodology.99  States thus had little flexibility 
in setting payment rates.  In the early 1980s, various acts of Congress, 
including the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1980 and 1981, 
provided states with enhanced flexibility in setting Medicaid payment 
 
physician-cost-shift-RR12-01-08.pdf (noting that the hospital industry has found 
Medicaid margins to be on average almost 15% lower than hospital costs). 
 96. See Reinhart, supra note 92.  Pete Wertheim, vice president of the Arizona 
Hospital and Healthcare Association stated that the “cumulative effect of all of these 
cuts have really begun to take their toll on hospitals.” Id.  On November 29, 2011, Ar-
izona hospitals filed suit in the U.S. District Court in Phoenix, arguing that “the rate 
cut will reduce patient access to health care providers, in violation of federal law.” 
Mary K. Reinhart, Arizona Hospitals’ Lawsuit Aims to Block Medicaid Cut, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/arti 
cles/2011/11/29/20111129arizona-hospitals-lawsuit-aims-block-medicaid-cut.html.  
The President and CEO of the Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Associations stated 
that “[w]e’re asking the court to prevent . . . cut[s] that will otherwise force hospitals 
to attempt to shift costs to purchasers of private health insurance . . . . The cost shift 
amounts to a hidden health-care tax on all consumers.” Id. 
 97. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the highly publicized 
case where a hospital in Michigan was forced to close its obstetrical unit due to the 
state’s inadequate Medicaid payments, which reimbursed only 65% of the hospital’s 
costs).  
 98. Roughly 17% of states reported problems with access to primary care for 
Medicaid beneficiaries; 36% reported problems with access to specialty care; and 
39% reported problems with access to dental care. VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., THE 
HENRY J. KAISER FOUNDATION, HEADED FOR A CRUNCH: AN UPDATE ON MEDICAID 
SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY HEADING INTO AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN; RE-
SULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY FOR STATE FISCAL YEARS 2008 
AND 2009 55 fig.29 (2008), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7815.pdf.  
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E) (1979) (“reasonable cost related basis”), § 
1396a(a)(30) (1976) (“reasonable charges”); see Rosemary H. Ratcliff, Note, The 
Mistakes of Medicaid: Provider Payment During the Last Decade and Lessons for 
Health Care Reform in the 21st Century, 35 B.C. L. REV. 141, 143 (1993) (“Prior to 
1981, states were required to pay all [M]edicaid providers on the basis of uniform 
[M]edicare “reasonable charges,” which were determined by the Secretary of 
[HHS].”).  For an in depth discussion of “reasonable cost” methodology, see Stephen 
M. Weiner, “Reasonable Cost” Reimbursement for Inpatient Hospital Services Un-
der Medicare and Medicaid: The Emergence of Public Control, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 
(1977). 
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rates.100  The key aspect of this change was the adoption of the Boren 
Amendment, which allowed states to provide payment based on 
methods and standards, that the state developed, so long as the rates 
were “reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be in-
curred by efficiently and economically operated facilities.”101  The 
Boren Amendment provided states flexibility in payment of provid-
ers, but also resulted in significant judicial oversight and scrutiny of 
states’ Medicaid reimbursement rates.102  For example, in 1990, the 
Supreme Court, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,103 af-
firmed that under the Boren Amendment institutional providers had 
a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permitted 
them to challenge states’ low Medicaid reimbursement rates.104  Thus, 
for a period of time, the Supreme Court in Wilder and Wilder’s prog-
eny105 held that the Boren Amendment created a cause of action for 
providers.106  But as the “burden of covering Medicaid costs grew, 
States began to ‘clamor’ for the right to run their own programs.”107  
And in 1997, Congress responded by repealing the Boren Amend-
ment, which effectively reduced the likelihood that providers and 
beneficiaries could raise successful challenges to states’ reimburse-
ment rates.108 
 
 100. See Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (Boren Amendment); 
Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2173, 95 Stat. 808 (1981) (expanding Boren Amendment to apply 
to hospitals); Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2174(a), 95 Stat. 809 (1981) (removing “reasonable 
charges” language from section 30(A)).  
 101. Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2650, § 962(a) (amending Section 1902(a)(13)(E) 
of the Social Security Act). 
 102. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to Medicaid: 
Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms 
Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 983 (2002); see also Ratcliff, supra note 99, at 143 
(“Recognizing the inherently inflationary nature of these payments, Congress 
amended the federal Medicaid statute in 1980 and 1981 to allow states flexibility and 
creativity in payment of providers, within general federal guidelines.”). 
 103. 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
 104. Id. at 509–10. 
 105. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997); Methodist 
Hosp. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 1996); Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore v. 
Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996); Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 
1993).  
 106. See Matthew, supra note 102, at 983. 
 107. Id.  
 108. See id. at 984. 
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a. The Equal Access Provision 
Repeal of the Boren Amendment meant that federal regulation of 
state payment policies was left to 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A) (Section 
(30)(A)).109  Section (30)(A) requires States to ensure that their pay-
ment policies (1) safeguard against unnecessary utilization of care; (2) 
ensure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care; and (3) “are sufficient to enlist enough providers so 
that care and services are available under the plan at least to the ex-
tent that such care and services are available to the general popula-
tion in the geographic area.”110  The second requirement sets a ceiling 
on provider payments, whereas the third requirement, often referred 
to as the equal access provision, sets a floor.111 
Medicaid regulations preventing States from setting provider reim-
bursement rates above the Upper Payment Level (UPL) are derived 
from the “efficiency” and “economy” language in Section (30)(A).112  
The general rule that applies to each category of institutional provid-
ers is that “aggregate Medicaid payments to a group of facilities with-
in one of the categories” may not exceed the maximum amount the 
providers would have received under Medicare.113  As a result of the-
se regulations, FFP will not be available to states for payments to 
classes of providers in excess of the UPL.114  Thus, UPL is the federal 
 
 109. See Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent Trends in 
Medicaid Preemption Actions, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 120, 129 (2010) 
(explaining that the repeal of the Boren Amendment “left § 1396a(a)(30) . . . as the 
primary federal guideline for state reimbursement rates”).  
 110. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006).  
[A state plan for medical assistance must] . . . provide such methods and 
procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and ser-
vices available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against 
unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that pay-
ments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are 
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available 
under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available 
to the general population in the geographic area. . . . 
Id. 
 111. See Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1497 (“Congress intended payments to be 
flexible within a range; payments should be no higher than what is required to pro-
vide efficient and economical care, but still high enough to provide for quality care 
and to ensure access to services.”).  
 112. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.271, 447.272(b), 447.321(b), 447.325 (2011). 
 113. 42 C.F.R. § 447.321(b)(2). 
 114. See DEBORAH BACHRACH, CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, PAY-
MENT REFORM: CREATING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR MEDICAID 7 (2010).  
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government’s tool to ensure that States do not pay too much for Med-
icaid-covered services.115 
The equal access provision of Section (30)(A) is the federal gov-
ernment’s tool to ensure that States do not pay too little, thereby im-
peding Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to services.  The equal access 
provision was originally added by amendment in 1989, although it had 
been implemented previously through federal regulation.116  In codi-
fying the equal access regulation, Congress stated that Medicaid pay-
ments must be at a level that “ensures that Medicaid beneficiaries 
in . . . [a particular geographic] area have at least the same access to 
physicians as the rest of the insured population in that area.”117 
Some commentators suggest that in codifying the equal access pro-
vision Congress foresaw the temptation States would face to set low 
reimbursement rates for healthcare providers, particularly when state 
budgets were tight.118  Even with the enactment of the equal access 
provision, however, States retain flexibility to establish their own re-
imbursement rate setting and payment systems.  Although the process 
for setting Medicaid reimbursement rates varies from state to state, 
across the board state rates have been “significantly lower than those 
of both Medicare and private insurers.”119  This discrepancy is prob-
lematic as reimbursement rates are an important determinant of pro-
vider participation and access to services for Medicaid beneficiar-
ies.120  Generally, there is little incentive for physicians to participate 
in Medicaid if their payments are too far below market levels.121  
 
 115. ANDY SCHNEIDER & DAVID ROUSSEAU, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID 
AND THE UNINSURED, UPPER PAYMENT LIMITS: REALITY AND ILLUSION IN MEDICAID 
FINANCING 3 (2002), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/secu 
rity/getfile.cfm&PageID=14122.  
 116. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (2011) (“The agency’s payments must be sufficient to 
enlist enough providers so that services under the plan are available to recipients at 
least to the extent that those services are available to the general population.”). 
 117. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1989, H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 
390 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2116. 
 118. See, e.g., Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 677. 
 119. See Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: Preemption 
Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect Medicaid Recipient’s Access to Healthcare, 
51 B. C. L. REV. 1583, 1592 (2010).  Frequently, state reimbursement rates are set in a 
state’s budget proposal, and the state agency that administers Medicaid will submit its 
reimbursement methodology to CMS through a SPA.  Alternatively, some states 
have enacted statutes that prescribe a particular methodology for rate setting or a 
specific rate for specific medical services. Id.  
 120. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.  
 121. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and Access to the Courts, 364 N. ENG. J. 
MED. 1489, 1490 (2011) (suggesting that the equal access provision was included in 
the Medicaid Act to ensure that the right to Medicaid is more than an “empty prom-
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Thus, low reimbursement rates can impede access to health care for 
Medicaid beneficiaries.122 
On average, states pay 43% of all Medicaid expenditures, and with 
the exception of Vermont, all States must produce annual balanced 
budgets (unlike the federal government).123  Thus, States have strong 
incentives to manage carefully their Medicaid programs’ cost 
growth.124  States look to cut Medicaid spending in order to close their 
budget gaps.125  During an economic recession, the economy goes 
down, while Medicaid enrollment goes up.126  “Historically, for every 
 
ise of care”); Bruce C. Vladeck & Stephen I. Vladeck, Killing Medicaid the Califor-
nia Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at A31; see also Andrew R. Gardella, The Equal 
Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Pri-
vate Enforcement of § 1396A(A)(30) of the Medicaid Act Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 
U. MEM. L. REV. 697, 756 (2008) (“When states fail to set economically rational re-
imbursement rates, providers have no economic incentive to treat Medicaid patients, 
thus leaving Medicaid beneficiaries without access to medical care.”); Guiltinan, su-
pra note 119, at 1592–93 (“Physicians frequently cite low Medicaid reimbursement 
rates as their principal reason for refusing to accept Medicaid patients.”). 
 122. See Guiltinan, supra note 119, at 1593; Peter J. Cunningham & Len M. Nich-
ols, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement on the Access to Care of Medicaid En-
rollees: A Community Perspective, 62 MED. CARE & RES. 676 (2005). 
 123. Whether all states require a balanced budget can be disputed, depending on 
the way the requirements are defined.  The National Conference of State Legisla-
tures (NCSL) has traditionally reported that forty-nine states must balance their 
budgets, with Vermont being the exception.  Other authorities add Wyoming and 
North Dakota as exceptions, and some authorities in Alaska contend that it does not 
have an explicit requirement for a balanced budget. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 
2 (2010) (“Two points can be made with certainty, however: most states have formal 
balanced budget requirements with some degree of stringency, and state political cul-
tures reinforce the requirements.”). 
 124. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 48, at 2.  
 125. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 
supra note 16, at 28 (noting that “cost containment in Medicaid is a dominant theme” 
and “nearly every state implemented at least one new Medicaid policy to address 
costs in fiscal year 2011.”  “[A]s in previous years, provider rate restrictions were the 
most commonly reported cost containment strategy.”).  For recommendations on 
containing Medicaid costs without cutting provider rates, see MICHELLE LILIENFELD 
& JANE PERKINS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: MEDICAID COST 
CONTAINMENT WITHOUT HARMING BENEFICIARIES (2011), http://www.healthlaw.org/ 
images/stories/FS_Medicaid_CC_Sept_2011_NHeLPv2.pdf.  
 126. Therefore, it is not surprising that provider rate reductions and restrictions 
was the most commonly reported cost containment strategy reported for FY 2011–
2012. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 7.  “A total of 39 states [reduced or] restricted 
provider rates in FY 2011 and 46 states reported plans to do so in FY 2012.” Id.; see 
also THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, MEDICAID COST 
CONTAINMENT: RECENT PROPOSALS AND TRENDS 2 (2011) (“39 states in Fiscal Year 
2010 implemented a provider rate cut or freeze compared to 33 states in FY 2009. In 
FY 2011, 37 states planned provider rate restrictions.”).  Increased federal assistance 
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1% increase in the national unemployment rate, state revenues de-
cline an average of 3 to 4% and enrollment in Medicaid increases by 
one million new recipients.”127  As unemployment rises, more people 
enroll in state Medicaid programs, but States have less tax revenue to 
pay for them.128  The countercyclical nature of the Medicaid program 
results in greater Medicaid expenditures, when States can least afford 
it.129  In response, States must look for ways to contain Medicaid ex-
penditures, and reducing provider payments is often seen as the only 
or best option.130 
b. Enforcing the Equal Access Provision 
State payments policies are under increasing scrutiny.  Providers 
are vociferously opposing budget-driven rate cuts, and policy makers 
are taking note of the opposition, especially in light of the forthcom-
ing expansion of the Medicaid program under the health reform law.  
The equal access provision provides a standard by which to judge 
payment adequacy in Medicaid.131  On May 6, 2011, CMS issued a 
proposed amendment to the Medicaid regulations to clarify states’ 
obligations under the equal access provision and “create a standard-
ized, transparent process for States” to assess whether their rates are 
 
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s (ARRA) enhanced FMAP 
helped support state budgets and their Medicaid programs and reduced the state 
share of Medicaid costs in FY 2009 and FY 2010, but the expiration of these funds 
means that a large increase in state funding will be necessary for state Medicaid pro-
grams in FY 2012. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 16.   
 127. Randy Edwards, The Medicaid Trap, H&HN MAGAZINE (Jan. 2010). 
 128. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 
supra note 16, at 28 (“Medicaid spending, similar to health care spending is projected 
to increase faster than the economy as a whole.”). 
 129. See Shefall S. Kulkarni, Puzzling Out How to Help States with Hard-Hit Med-
icaid Budgets, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), http://capsules.kaiserhealth 
news.org/index.php/2011/11/puzzling-out-how-to-help-states-with-hard-hit-medicaid-
budgets/. 
 130. See THE NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, MEDICAID COST CON-
TAINMENT: RECENT PROPOSALS AND TRENDS 2 (2011) (“Provider rates are linked to 
economic conditions and under budget pressure states are often forced to reduce 
rates until economic conditions improve.”). 
 131. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that Section 30(A) of the 
Medicaid Act sets a ceiling and a floor on payments).  But Section 30(A) does not 
explicitly mention provider costs or cost studies and three circuit courts have deter-
mined that CMS need not consider provider costs in deciding whether or not to ap-
prove a State Plan Amendment. See Rite Aid v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 853 (3d Cir. 
1999); Minn. Homecare Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 1997) (per 
curiam); Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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sufficient.132  Prior to the proposal of this rule, states had very little 
guidance from CMS on how to assess whether state payment policies 
provide for sufficient access to beneficiaries under Section (30)(A).133  
Moreover, even though CMS has the authority to enforce the federal 
statute against state agencies, “it has never created an enforcement 
scheme that [has worked] to police state failures.”134 
Until the rule proposed in 2011, CMS provided little guidance to 
states on rate-setting and rarely found rates too low, instead focusing 
its attention on ensuring that rates were not too high.135  Historically, 
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenged rate cuts by bringing 
judicial action against state Medicaid agencies to enjoin states from 
reducing provider reimbursement rates that allegedly violated the 
Medicaid Act’s equal access provision.136  The federal circuit courts 
split in their analysis of the substantive requirements of the equal ac-
cess provision.137  But this circuit split on the merits has been put on 
 
 132. 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (May 6, 2011).  For further discussion of CMS’ proposed 
rule see infra Part II.A.1. 
 133. See Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 1490 (explaining that despite the fact that 
the federal government has had the power to provide oversight of states’ reimburse-
ment rates and compliance with the equal access provision under the federal Medi-
caid statute for twenty-two years, HHS has “never issued detailed compliance stand-
ards, much less enforced them”). 
 134. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2341. 
 135. See Nicole Huberfield, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 
1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 462 (2008) (noting that 
CMS “is notoriously uninterested in enforcing the terms of State plans against the 
states; instead it seeks cooperation, when it makes demands at all”); see also Mat-
thew, supra note 102, at 989–90 (“Researchers have documented the fact that dispari-
ty among the states’ Medicaid coverage and expenditures increases as federal over-
sight of the program decreases.”).  
 136. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (allowing private en-
forcement of a Medicaid Act provision concerning payment for institutional ser-
vices).  
 137. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits addressed the procedures a state undertook 
before setting rates, while the Third and Seventh Circuits focused on the effects of a 
state’s payment rate. See Rite Aid v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851–52, 856 (finding 
that although the equal access provision only requires a “result,” not a “process,” the 
process cannot be arbitrary and capricious, but the court noted that “although budg-
etary provisions may not be the sole basis for a rate revision, they may be considered 
given that [Section (30)(A)] mandates an economical result”); Orthopaedic Hosp. v. 
Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the equal access provision 
specifically requires that state payment rates “bear a reasonable relationship” to the 
cost of providing service and that states cannot set payment rates without “responsi-
ble cost studies”); Methodist Hosp. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(finding that the equal access provision does not require states to conduct access 
studies in advance of modifying their rates); Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 
529, 530 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that the lack of procedural safeguards (i.e. cost stud-
ies) combined with the fact that the only apparent justification for the reimbursement 
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hold.  In 2002, the Supreme Court issued a decision that called into 
question whether Medicaid providers and beneficiaries even have 
standing to seek judicial relief.138  Ten years later, the Supreme Court 
has yet to take a definitive stance on the standing issue, but the 
Court’s most recent decision in Douglas v. Independent Living Cen-
ter of Southern California undoubtedly suggests that the right of ben-
eficiaries and providers to challenge rate cuts in the courts is dubious 
at best.139 
The Medicaid Act, unlike the statute underlying Medicare, does 
not expressly address the question of whether private parties have ac-
cess to the courts to prevent injury resulting from state action.140  Pri-
or to 2002, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries enforced the equal 
access provision by bringing suit against states pursuant to a civil 
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983).141  In Gonzaga Univer-
sity v. Doe,142 however, the Supreme Court held that a federal law is 
not privately enforceable unless Congress has unambiguously mani-
fested its intent to confer individual rights on the beneficiary of a 
statute.143  Following this decision, a majority of the circuit courts 
 
cuts was budgetary, meant that the Arkansas Department of Human Services was in 
violation of the equal access provision).  
 138. See generally Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 139. 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 2012).  The Court grant-
ed certiorari to decide whether Medicaid providers and recipients may maintain a 
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce a federal Medicaid law, which 
providers and beneficiaries argued conflicted with and therefore preempted state 
Medicaid statutes that reduce payments to providers. Id. at *2.  In a five to four deci-
sion, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to determine wheth-
er the plaintiffs’ case on the Supremacy Clause can move forward in light of the fed-
eral government’s post-oral argument approval of the challenged rate reductions. Id.; 
see also Jason Millman, SCOTUS Punts on Calif. Medicaid Suit, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 
2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73165.html (noting that even 
though the lawsuit is still valid, the Court’s opinion suggests that the Supremacy 
Clause is not the right way to challenge [Medicaid] rate cuts).  
 140. See Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 1489. 
 141. See Rite Aid, 171 F.3d 842; Minn. Home Care Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917; 
Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d 1491; Methodist Hosp., Inc., 91 F.3d 1026; Visiting 
Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996); Ark. Med. Soc’y, 6 
F.3d 519; see also supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s judicial enforcement of the now-repealed Boren Amendment in Wilder and 
its progeny).  For further discussion of the lawsuits challenging low or reduced Medi-
caid provider payment rates under 1983, see CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDA-
TION, MEDICAID PAYMENT RATE LAWSUITS: EVOLVING COURT VIEWS MEAN UN-
CERTAIN FUTURE FOR MEDI-CAL (Oct. 2009). 
 142. 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 143. See id. at 280. 
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have found the equal access provision unenforceable under Section 
1983.144 
Without a cause of action under Section 1983, Medicaid providers 
and beneficiaries turned to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 
seeking relief based on a preemption claim.145  That is, plaintiffs have 
argued that state laws “interfere with, or are contrary to” federal 
law.146  In Douglas, a consolidation of several legal challenges,147 Cali-
fornia Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenged cuts to Cali-
fornia’s Medicaid reimbursement rates.148  Plaintiffs, including phar-
macies, health care providers, and senior citizens’ groups, argued that 
the cuts violated the equal access provision of the Medicaid Act and 
therefore were preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution.149 
 
 144. See Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 702–03 (5th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 34 (2008); N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging, 
Inc. v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2006); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 
1146–48 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1305 (2007); Westside Mothers v. 
Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 541–43 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 
1062 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 
56–59 (1st Cir. 2004); see also SARAH SOMERS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, 
SUPREME COURT GRANTS REVIEW OF MEDICAID CASES 3 (Jan. 2011).  For further 
discussion of the judicial enforcement of the equal access provision following Gon-
zaga, see generally JANE PERKINS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, UPDATE ON 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEDICAID ACT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Nov. 
2011); Gardella, supra note 121; Brian J. Dunne, Enforcement of the Medicaid Act 
Under 42 USC § 1983 After Gonzaga University v. Doe: The “Dispassionate Lens” 
Examined, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (2007). 
 145. See Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 572 F.3d 644, 650 (9th Cir. 
2009); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 146. Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509–10 (quoting Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 510 
U.S. 597 (1991)). 
 147. The consolidated cases encompassed five lawsuits and produced seven deci-
sions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. 
v. Maxwell-Jolly, 380 F. App’x. 656 (9th Cir. 2010); Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger, 
596 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2010); Cal. Pharm. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 374 F.App’x 690 (9th Cir. 
2010); Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 342 F. App’x. 306 (9th Cir. 
2009); Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009); Cal. 
Pharm. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009).   
 148. 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 149. Brief for Petitioners, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 
2062344, at *26.  For an in depth discussion of whether providers and beneficiaries 
can enforce the equal access provision through the Supremacy Clause, see Matthew 
McKennan, Medicaid Access After Health Reform: The Shifting Legal Basis for 
Equal Access, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 477, 499–503 (2011); Guiltinan, supra 
note 119, at 1601–22; Sayles, supra note 109, at 136–48.  
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The lawsuits were filed after California lawmakers in 2008 and 
2009 passed three statutes reducing reimbursement rates.150  Medicaid 
providers and beneficiaries filed a series of lawsuits seeking to enjoin 
the rate reductions on the ground that they conflicted with and there-
fore were preempted by federal Medicaid law, specifically, the equal 
access provision.151  The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed or ordered 
preliminary injunctions that prevented the State from implementing 
its statutes.152 
While these cuts were being challenged in the courts, California 
was also seeking approval from CMS.153  Although the cuts were ef-
fective July 1, 2008, California did not submit SPAs regarding the rate 
cuts until September 30, 2008.154  Over two years after California had 
implemented its rate cuts, CMS denied the SPA on November 18, 
2010, for lack of adequate information.155  California sought reconsid-
eration of CMS’ disapproval and a hearing to reconsider was held on 
February 10, 2011.156 
Meanwhile, California appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to en-
join California’s rate cuts and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to decide whether Medicaid providers and recipients may maintain a 
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce a federal 
Medicaid law.157  On October 27, 2011, less than a month after the 
 
 150. See Douglas, 2012 WL 555204. 
The first statute, enacted in February 2008, reduced by 10% payments that 
the State makes to various Medicaid providers, such as physicians, pharma-
cies, and clinics. See 2007–2008 Cal. Sess. Laws, 3d Extraordinary Sess. Ch. 
3, §§ 14, 15. The second statute, enacted in September 2008, replaced the 
10% rate reductions with a more modest set of cuts. See 2008 Cal. Sess. 
Laws ch. 758 §§ 45, 57. And the last statute, enacted in February 2009, 
placed a cap on the State’s maximum contribution to wages and benefits 
paid by counties to providers of in-home supportive services. See 2009–2010 
Cal. Sess. Laws, 3d Extraordinary Sess. Ch. 13 § 9. 
Id. at *3. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. at *4. 
 154. See Brief of Intervenor Respondents, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 
2011 WL 3288335, at *6. 
 155. See Notice of Hearing: Reconsideration of Disapproval of California State 
Plan Amendments (SPAs) 08-009A; 08-009B1; 08-009B2; 08-009D; and 08-019, 75 
Fed. Reg. 80058-01 (Dec. 21, 2010). 
 156. Id.  
 157. See Douglas, 2012 WL 555204, at *2. 
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Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Douglas case,158 CMS ap-
proved some of California’s rate cuts.159  In light of CMS’ decision, 
the Supreme Court in Douglas, in a five to four decision, vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s judgments and remanded the cases.160  Justice Breyer, 
writing for the majority, found that although the case was not moot, 
the lower courts would have to determine whether the plaintiffs could 
continue to proceed under the Supremacy Clause or should instead 
challenge CMS’ approval of California’s rate cuts under the APA, 
noting the deference generally given to agency decision-making.161  
The majority opinion notes that “to allow a Supremacy Clause action 
to proceed once the agency has reached a decision threatens potential 
inconsistency or confusion.”162  Although the majority declined to de-
cide whether the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action to en-
force the requirements of the Medicaid Act, the opinion casts doubt 
on the availability of a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.163 
According to both California164 and the federal government,165 
HHS, through CMS, is responsible for enforcing the equal access pro-
 
 158. Oral argument took place on October 3, 2011. See Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, at 2, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204, http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/09-958.pdf.  
 159. See Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) Announce Federal Ap-
proval of Medical Budget Reductions, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SER-
VICES (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/publications/opa/Docu 
ments/11-06%20SPA%20Approvals.pdf.  CMS based its decision to ultimately ap-
prove many of California’s cuts on a study submitted by the state to CMS indicating 
that cuts would not curtail access to care and that DHCS would also set up a data col-
lection and monitoring plan “to ensure that access to care is not compromised as the 
reductions are implemented.” CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SER-
VICES, MONITORING ACCESS TO MEDI-CAL COVERED HEALTHCARE SERVICES (2011), 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/Documents/Rate%20Reductions/Developing%20a%20Healt
hcare%20Access%20Monitoring%20System.pdf.  
 160. See Douglas, 2012 WL 555204, at *6.  
 161. Id. at *5. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. at *6.  Instead, the majority suggests that the changed circumstances may 
require the respondents to proceed by seeking review of the agency determination 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at *5. 
[The] agency decision does not change the underlying substantive question, 
namely whether California’s statutes are consistent with a specific federal 
statutory provision . . . .  But it may change the answer.  And it may require 
respondents now to proceed by seeking review of the agency determination 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., ra-
ther than in an action against California under the Supremacy Clause. 
Id. 
 164. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 149, at *26 (arguing that the purposes of 
Section (30)(A) reflected in the statute’s text and structure and the legislative history 
is to preserve and enhance “the States’ flexibility to control and reduce costs and in-
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vision, not the courts.166  Although Medicaid law and regulations cre-
ate an administrative enforcement scheme to ensure that states’ reim-
bursement rates do not violate the equal access provision, many have 
argued, including former HHS officials, that exclusive enforcement by 
the federal agency is “logistically, practically, legally and politically 
unfeasible.”167  By contrast, others suggest that shifting enforcement 
of the equal access provision from judicial forums to executive agen-
cies may be wise.168  Part II of this Note examines the administrative 
compliance mechanisms available to and utilized by CMS, consider-
ing whether the administrative processes established under the Medi-
 
crease the efficiency of Medicaid,” and to centralize “enforcement authority in 
HHS,” and to protect the “States from private lawsuits that drive up the cost of Med-
icaid”).  
 165. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Douglas, 
2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 2132705, at *31–*32 (arguing Section 
(30)(A)’s language suggests that a nonstatutory private right of action should not be 
recognized and that the “administrative process brings to bear ‘the expertise, uni-
formity, widespread consultation, and resulting administrative guidance that can ac-
company agency decisionmaking’” (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292 
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring))). But see Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 
3706105, at *5 (“Private enforcement . . . provides a means for meaningful statutory 
enforcement both until and unless the Secretary has the opportunity to exercise her 
discretion, and to ensure that the Secretary is acting within her discretion.”). 
 166. See Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 1490 (noting that the state argues that en-
forcement of Medicaid law by the federal government is sufficient); Vladeck, supra 
note 121. 
 167. Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 165, at *3.  
First, because the Medicaid Act contemplated—and has historically been 
understood to allow—direct redress by beneficiaries, neither CMS nor HHS 
has the resources to provide comprehensive oversight of state-by-state com-
pliance with the equal access provision. Second, because funds for the ad-
ministration of Medicaid are provided by appropriation, they are subject to 
far greater congressional budget constraints than Medicaid benefits. Third, 
as CMS itself has repeatedly conceded, it is limited both practically and le-
gally in its authority to both enforce § 30(A) and provide remedies for viola-
tions thereof. Fourth, and finally, even in the absence of such constraints, 
the “cooperative federalism” behind Medicaid means that the Executive 
Branch is under far more political pressure from states than from private 
parties.  
Id. at *3–*4. 
 168. See Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2382 (noting 
that judges are bad at understanding, evaluating, and creating health care regulations 
and suggesting that “we should embrace the reallocation of regulatory authority” be-
cause “federal executive agencies are significantly better positioned” than the 
courts). See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: 
A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2004) (suggesting that there are 
advantages to having the executive branch regulate health care over both the judici-
ary and the market). 
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caid law and regulations provide a sufficiently powerful tool to enable 
CMS to ensure compliance with the equal access provision. 
II.  ASSESSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT SCHEME 
WITH RESPECT TO THE EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION 
As discussed in Part I, there are two primary administrative reme-
dies available to CMS to ensure state compliance with the federal 
Medicaid Act, including the equal access provision.169  First, through 
the SPA process, CMS is able to review and approve or disapprove a 
state’s payment policies and any amendments thereto.170  If CMS dis-
approves a state plan or plan amendment, the state may seek recon-
sideration from the agency.171  If the agency subsequently upholds the 
decision, the state may petition for judicial review under Medicaid 
regulations and private parties, and states may challenge final agency 
action under the APA.172  Second, and separate and apart from the 
SPA process, the Secretary has the discretion to deny federal funds if 
the state’s payment policies do not comply with the equal access pro-
vision.173 
Neither the SPA process nor the authority to withhold federal 
funds, however, appear to be effective tools for ensuring state com-
pliance with the equal access provision.174  This procedural shortfall is 
because states do not require additional federal matching dollars 
when they decrease rates and therefore often act before the federal 
government has completed the SPA procedure.175  And, as noted 
above, aggrieved parties have previously sought injunctive relief un-
der Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, and more recently, under the 
Supremacy Clause; however, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gon-
zaga and Douglas strongly suggest that these judicial avenues are no 
longer viable, highlighting the need for an effective and timely admin-
istrative remedy.176 
 
 169. See supra Part I.B. 
 170. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.   
 171. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
 172. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
 174. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.  The U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office has criticized CMS for poor oversight of the states, emphasizing 
holes in the data provided by the states. See George France, The Form and Context 
of Federalism: Meanings for Health Care Financing, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
649, 689 (2008). 
 175. See infra notes 180–188 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 143–44, 163 and accompanying text.   
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A. SPA Process 
Requiring states to seek approval from CMS through the SPA pro-
cess gives CMS the opportunity to review a state Medicaid plan to de-
termine whether the state is in compliance with federal Medicaid laws 
and regulations.177  When states seek to increase reimbursement rates, 
they submit a SPA describing the planned increase in order to receive 
federal approval before they implement.178  States will delay imple-
mentation pending approval because they want to be certain that fed-
eral matching dollars will be forthcoming with respect to the in-
creased payment amount.179  There is no comparable incentive to 
delay implementation with respect to a rate decrease.  In fact, states 
do not always submit a SPA when decreasing reimbursement rates.  
States do not need more federal matching dollars in this situation; 
they need less.  In addition, states are anxious to reap the budgetary 
relief connected with rate cuts. 
CMS often withholds approval of SPAs that seek to increase reim-
bursement rates in violation of Section (30)(A) and the UPL;180 how-
ever, there are few examples of CMS denying SPAs that cut reim-
bursement rates.181  Given its financial participation, the federal 
government has a strong incentive to provide substantial oversight of 
states’ efforts to increase provider rates, as approval would result in 
the federal government having to pay more money to the states.182  
By contrast, CMS has less incentive to deny a SPA that seeks to cut 
reimbursement rates in a way that may violate the equal access provi-
 
 177. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.  
 178. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining that federal funds will 
not be provided for any state plan amendment until the agency approves the amend-
ment). 
 179. Without federal funds, state budget expenditures would rise by 22.5%, which 
one commentator suggests would create an unbearable burden for any state, especial-
ly in the midst of a nationwide fiscal crunch. See Peter Suderman, ObamaCare’s 
Medicaid Mandate, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 
424052970203824904577213642801222230.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.  
 180. See Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 682 n.43 (not-
ing that the federal government commonly relies on a state’s violation of Section 
(30)(A) and the regulatory UPL to justify a disallowance of FFP).  
 181. See CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, MEDICAID PAYMENT RATE 
LAWSUITS: EVOLVING COURT VIEWS MEAN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR MEDI-CAL 4 
(2009) (“In practice, federal agency oversight and action primarily has been focused 
on restricting state payments to providers, while enforcement of beneficiary safe-
guards has been relatively limited.”). 
 182. See Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2341 (“On the 
occasion that CMS does reject state plans or insist on amendments thereto, it almost 
always does so to protect its own funds from perceived state raids.”). 
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sion.183  Former HHS officials point out that there is no realistic fi-
nancial incentive for CMS to enforce aggressively the equal access 
provision against states’ cutting rates, since violations of the provision 
would save the federal government money.184  Instead, since CMS has 
discretion to take action against non-compliant states, the federal 
government often prefers to seek “cooperation”185 from states that 
want to cut reimbursement rates rather than disapproving SPAs or 
withholding federal funds.  In the past, CMS has focused almost ex-
clusively on ensuring that payment rates are not too high and do not 
exceed the UPL.  More recently, CMS has expanded its focus to in-
clude rate reductions in light of state budget-driven rate cuts that 
threaten to reduce provider capacity just as millions more Americans 
will become eligible for Medicaid in 2014.186 
Until recently, CMS had “sought to monitor and promote access 
through informal processes, principally by raising the issue of the ad-
equacy of rates in meetings and correspondence with state authori-
ties.”187  Even the proposed rule CMS published in May 2011 reflects 
this approach, creating new means of promoting adherence to Section 
(30)(A) short of federal disapproval or compliance proceedings.188  
 
 183. See id.  
 184. Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 165, at *25–*26 (“If anything, be-
cause poorer states tend to have the highest percentage of their Medicaid outlays re-
imbursed by the federal government, the states under the greatest pressure to cut 
costs will be those in which the federal government spends (and stands comparatively 
to save) the highest proportion of funds.”). 
 185. Huberfield, supra note 135, at 462 (explaining that CMS monitors states’ 
compliance with federal rules through informal processes).  
 186. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26348 (proposed May 6, 2011) (noting that since 2008, 
CMS has asked states to provide more information “to help the agency determine 
that the changes to rates resulting from State plan amendments will continue to pro-
vide for access to care consistent with the Act and the implementing regulations”). 
 187. Brief of Former HHS Officers, supra note 165, at *25 (citing Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Secretary of Health & Human Services at 12, Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572 
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 87-1700)).  States may be more inclined to “cooperate” with 
the federal government when they are in need of federal matching funds, but may be 
less inclined where they simply want to cut Medicaid funding.  For example, after 
California submitted a SPA to HHS regarding rate cuts on September 30, 2008, CMS 
requested that California provide additional information, but California never re-
sponded.  Instead, California continued to implement the rate cuts without CMS ap-
proval. See Brief of Intervenor Respondents, supra note 154, at *6.  
 188. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26345 (proposed May 6, 2011).  At the time this Note 
was written, CMS had not issued a final rule.  Unfortunately, there is no way of 
knowing whether the final rule will look anything like the proposed rules.  Moreover, 
proposed rules take a long time to be finalized as they often face enormous political 
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The proposed rule seeks to clarify and reinforce that beneficiary ac-
cess must be considered in setting and adjusting payment methodolo-
gies for Medicaid services and emphasize that payment rate changes 
are not in compliance with the equal access provision if they result in 
a denial of sufficient access to covered care and services.189 
The proposed rule provides a framework for states to assess access 
to care.190  States would be required to conduct medical assistance ac-
cess reviews191 for every covered Medicaid service.192  Under the pro-
posed rule, if a state Medicaid agency seeks to reduce or restructure 
Medicaid payment rates, the agency would be required to submit, 
along with the SPA, an access review for the service in question that 
has been completed within the prior twelve months and that demon-
strates sufficient access.193  Finally, the agency would have to develop 
procedures to monitor continued access to care after implementation 
of the payment rate reduction or restructuring.194  The rule’s access 
framework, CMS contends, is intended to provide additional guid-
ance to states on the standards the states must follow to demonstrate 
that their Medicaid beneficiaries have sufficient access to medical ser-
vices.195 
 
pressures from states and other stakeholders. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, PROVIDER PAYMENT AND ACCESS TO MEDICAID SERVICES: A SUM-
MARY OF CMS’ MAY 6 PROPOSED RULE 3, (2011) (“Given the high level of interest in 
the proposed rule . . . and the different perspectives . . . on . . . whether it goes far 
enough or too far, it is difficult to anticipate what shape the final rule will take.”); 
Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and Access to Health Care—A Proposal for Continued 
Inaction?, 365 N. ENGL. J. MED. 102, 103 (2011).  
 189. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,343 (proposed May 6, 2011); THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 188, at 1.  
 190. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 188, at 1.  
 191. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Ser-
vices, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26345 (proposed May 6, 2011).  
 192. Such reviews are not currently required.  The state Medicaid agency  
would have to review access to a subset of Medicaid-covered services every 
year, and review access to every Medicaid-covered service at least once eve-
ry five years.  Each state would have discretion as to the measures it uses to 
analyze access to care and the services it reviews in any given year. 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 188, at 2. 
 193. Along with the SPA, the agency would also have to submit an analysis reflect-
ing its consideration of beneficiary and stakeholder input on the impact of the pro-
posed rate change on continued access to the affected service. Id.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Ser-
vices, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26348 (proposed May 6, 2011).  
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Notably, the proposed rule does not specify what, if any, conse-
quences states would face if they failed to comply with the new re-
quirements.196  Although the proposed rule acknowledges that states 
have previously failed to take access determinations seriously,197 the 
rule notes that rather than disapproving state rate cuts or instituting 
compliance actions against states whose cuts violate the equal access 
provision, CMS’ strategy “is designed to allow for State and Federal 
review of beneficiary access to evolve over time and for States to im-
plement effective and efficient approaches and solutions that are ap-
propriate to their local and perhaps changing circumstances.”198  Sev-
eral comments to the proposed rule argue that the rule “does not go 
far enough in establishing a mechanism for measuring access to care 
that is . . . enforceable.”199  Although the proposed rule may provide a 
useful framework for states to assess whether provider reimburse-
ment rates comply with the equal access provision and are sufficient 
to ensure access to services, it does not provide a clear remedy to 
compel compliance when state resources are sparse.200 
Significantly, the Medicaid Act and regulations are unclear as to 
whether CMS approval is required before states may implement rate 
cuts.201  In Exeter Memorial Hospital Ass’n v. Belshe,202 the Ninth 
 
 196. See Rosenbaum, supra note 188, at 103 (describing the proposed rules as a 
“model of inaction”).  
 197. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Ser-
vices, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26348 (“When asked for additional detail on the method-
ology that States used to determine compliance with the access requirement, only a 
few States indicated that they relied upon actual data to make a determination.”). 
 198. Id. at 26344.  The proposed rule, however, goes on to clarify that at § 
447.204(b) CMS “may disapprove a proposed rate reduction or restructuring SPA 
that does not include or consider the data review and a public process.” Id. at 26352.  
Alternatively, CMS can take compliance action in accordance with regulation at 42 
C.F.R. § 430.35 in these instances. Id.   
 199. Comment of Center on Budget and Policy Priorities at 1 (July 5, 2011), in re-
sponse to Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342. 
 200. See Rosenbaum, supra note 188, at 103 (noting that “because the rule speci-
fies neither standards for adequate access nor an independent evidentiary process, it 
would be nearly impossible for the federal government to enforce the rule.”); see also 
Comment of Greater New York Hospital Association, at 3 (July 5, 2011), in response 
to Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 
76 Fed. Reg. 26,342 (noting that states must have flexibility to develop measures to 
demonstrate compliance with the access measurement framework “given the limited 
resources that many state Medicaid programs have to devote to such analyses.”). 
 201. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2) (“Prompt submittal of amendments is necessary . 
. . [s]o that CMS can determine whether the plan continues to meet the requirements 
for approval, [and] to ensure the availability of FFP.”). 
 202. 145 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1998).  
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Circuit held that California’s Medicaid agency could not implement a 
SPA that was submitted to CMS but not yet approved.203  California 
argued that the rate cuts were in compliance with the (now repealed) 
Boren Amendment, and thus could be implemented.204 The Court 
found that to permit implementation before a SPA is approved would 
put “a reimbursement rate in place for a considerable time period 
that had never been approved, that may not be approved, and that 
may be inadequate under the standards set in the statute and regula-
tions.”205  The legal impact of the Exeter decision, however, is un-
clear. Some courts have recognized its legal authority,206 while others 
argue that the case does not apply to post-Boren Amendment rate 
setting.207  Another court recognized the Exeter holding but found 
that the courts are split on the issue.208 
Arguably consistent with the holding in Exeter, CMS issued guid-
ance in October that suggests that implementation is not permitted 
prior to SPA approval.209  The letter to all State Medicaid Directors 
(SMD) stated that “[f]ederal statute and regulations require CMS to 
review and approve [plan amendments] . . . before a state may im-
plement Medicaid program modifications.”210  At least one court, 
 
 203. Id. at 1108; see AGI-Bluff Manor, Inc. v. Reagen, 713 F. Supp. 1535, 1552 
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (“The Medicaid Act and HHS regulations require that a state Med-
icaid plan or an amendment to the plan receive federal approval from [CMS] prior to 
implementation.”). 
 204. Exeter Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1108.  
 205. Id. at 1124 (quoting Exeter Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 943 F. Supp. 1239, 
1243 (E.D. Cal. 1996)). 
 206. See Cal. Hosp. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (E.D. Cal. 
2011) (“Any amendment to the State Plan, including changes in the methodology for 
determining reimbursement rates, cannot be implemented until the amendment has 
been approved by CMS.”). 
 207. See Appellants Joint Opening Brief, Cal. Ass’n of Health Facilities v. Doug-
las, No. 11-558851 (9th Cir. June 23, 2011), 2011 WL 2617609 at *10–*11. 
 208. Compare Cmty. Pharmacies of Ind. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., No. 
1:11-cv-0893-TWP-DKL, 2011 WL 4102804, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2011) (finding 
that the Seventh Circuit has maintained the position that proposed amendments may 
be implemented before approval is received), with Exeter Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 145 
F.3d at 1108 (“[A]pproval is required before implementation of amendments to the 
Plan.”). 
 209. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Director, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices to State Medicaid Director & State Health Official 1 (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www. 
dmh.ca.gov/services_and_programs/medi_cal/docs/SMD10_020SPAReviewProcess.p
df. 
 210. Id.  The letter also states that although “[i]n the past, the review process has 
required that any issue identified during the review of SPA must be resolved . . . .  
States will now have the option to resolve the issues related to State plan provisions 
that are not integral to the SPA through a separate process.” Id.  Cuts to reimburse-
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however, refused to give this letter “considerable weight” in deter-
mining whether approval was required before states implement rate 
reductions because “CMS has not exactly been a model of consistency 
on this issue.”211  Additionally, the proposed rule, which was pub-
lished after the SMD letter, contains no language even suggesting that 
CMS requires approval prior to states’ implementation of rate cuts. 
As CMS has failed to state explicitly whether prior approval is re-
quired, states have continued to implement rate reductions before 
CMS review.  For example, as noted above, California enacted212 and 
implemented213 its 2008 and 2009 rate cuts before California even 
submitted its SPA to CMS and continued even after HHS originally 
disapproved them.214  California has specifically taken the position 
 
ment rates, however, are integral to any SPA.  The argument could also be made that 
approval is required only when states are seeking to qualify for additional federal 
funds. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 165. 
 211. Cmty. Pharmacies of Ind. v. Ind. Family & Social Servs. Admin., No. 1:11-cv-
0893-TWP-DKL, 2011 WL 4102804, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2011). 
 212. California’s Assembly Bill 5 was chaptered on Feb. 16, 2008. Assembly Bill 
No. 5, 2007–2008 Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. (Cal. 2008), An act to amend Section 95004 of the 
Government Code and to amend Sections 4640.6, 4643, 4648.4, 4681.3, 4681.5, 4691.6, 
4781.6, and 4783 of, and to add Sections 4681.6, 4689.8, 4691.9, 14041.1, 14105.19, and 
14166.245 to, the Welfare and Institutions Code, relating to health, and declaring the 
urgency thereof, to take effect immediately. 
 213. California’s Assembly Bill 5 reduced provider reimbursement rates by 10% 
“on and after July 1, 2008.” Id. 
 214. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 158, at 6 (Justice Kagan ques-
tioned whether California made an “end-run” around the administrative process by 
putting “new rate schedules [] into effect even before [California] submitted them to 
HHS, and continued them in effect while HHS was considering them, and continued 
them in effect to the extent [California was] allowed to do so by injunction, even after 
HHS disapproved them.”); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); supra 
notes 155–59 and accompanying text (explaining that California sought reconsidera-
tion of CMS’ disapproval, a hearing to reconsider was held on February 10, 2011, and 
CMS ultimately approved California’s rate cuts on October 27, 2011).  In light of 
CMS’ approval of California’s rate cuts, the Supreme Court asked the parties in 
Douglas to submit briefing on the effect of CMS’ action. See Douglas v. Indep. Living 
Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 2012). In their 
briefs, the Solicitor General and California Attorney General asked the Court to de-
cide the case, see Letters from Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor Gen. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, and Karin S. Schwartz, Dep. Attorney Gen. Cal. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. 
William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 18, 2011), while the providers 
and beneficiaries argued that the Court should dismiss certiorari as improvidently 
granted based on the intervening events. See Letters from Carter G. Phillips, Sidley 
Austin LLP, and Lynn S. Carmen to Hon. William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme 
Court (Nov. 18, 2011).  More recently, the California Hospital Association (CHA) 
petitioned a federal district court to grant a preliminary injunction against the Cali-
fornia’s Medicaid program, to prevent it from making 10% reimbursement cuts pri-
marily affecting hospital-based skilled nursing facilities. See Melanie Evans, Injunc-
tion Sought Against Calif. Medicaid Rate Cut, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Nov. 22, 
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that the Exeter decision does not apply to post-Boren Amendment 
rate setting and therefore it is free to go ahead and implement rate 
reductions prior to CMS approval.215 
The proposed rule fails to resolve this ambiguity.  Many commen-
tators argued that the final rule should state explicitly that CMS pro-
hibits states from implementing any SPA that reduces or restructures 
payment rates until CMS approval is obtained.216  Even if the final 
rule, however, were to specify that CMS approval is required before 
states may implement reimbursement rate cuts, there is limited action 
that can be taken against states for non-compliance.  The provisions 
of the Medicaid Act that allow CMS to withhold some or all of a 
state’s federal matching dollars if they are out of compliance are the 
intended mechanism for holding states accountable for their Medicaid 
obligations.217  Neither the proposed rule nor the current Medicaid 
rules specify an alternative penalty and as discussed below, CMS al-
most never withholds federal matching funds. 
B. Compliance Action 
To qualify for federal matching funds, a state plan must comply 
with the requirements of the equal access provision.218  The Secretary 
of HHS, through CMS, may withhold funding from a state where its 
Medicaid payment policies do not so comply.219  In fact, some argue 
that withholding federal funds is the only remedy available to CMS 
 
2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20111122/NEWS/311229968/injunc 
tion-sought-against-calif-rate-cuts.  And on January 31, 2012, the U.S. District Court 
Judge issued an injunction blocking the rate cuts, noting that the “state’s fiscal crisis 
does not outweigh the serious irreparable injury plaintiffs would suffer absent the is-
suance of an injunction.” See Chris Megerian, Judge Issues Injunction Blocking 
Healthcare Cuts; State to Appeal, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1 2012), http://latimesblogs.la 
times.com/california-politics/2012/02/california-budget-healthcare.html.  
 215. Appellants Joint Opening Brief, Cal. Ass’n of Health Facilities v. Douglas, 
No. 11-558851, 2011 WL 2617609, at *10–*11 (9th Cir. June 23, 2011). 
 216. See Comment of National Health Law Program, at 3, in response to Medicaid 
Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 
26,342 (proposed May 6, 2011) (“CMS should amend the regulations to absolutely 
clarify that SPAs that include rate reductions cannot be implemented until CMS has 
an opportunity to review and make a decision. . . .”); Comment of Greater New York 
Hospital Association, supra note 200, at 4 (“In the final rule, CMS should clearly 
identify the consequences of non-compliance. At a minimum, we recommend that 
CMS prohibit states from implementing any SPA that reduces or redistributes fund-
ing until CMS approval is obtained.”). 
 217. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.  
 218. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.   
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for state violations of the Medicaid Act, including the equal access 
provision.220  In a brief to the Supreme Court opposing certiorari in 
the Douglas case, however, the United States argued that “programs 
in which the drastic measure of withholding all or a major portion of 
federal funding if the only available remedy would be generally less 
effective than a system that also permits awards of injunctive relief in 
private actions.”221  In other words, since withholding all or a major 
portion of federal funding is an extreme and arguably draconian rem-
edy,222 other remedies are necessary to complement and make mean-
ingful CMS’ enforcement powers. 
The United States reiterated this point in Planned Parenthood of 
Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Department of 
Health.223  The Indiana legislature passed legislation prohibiting pro-
viders that furnish abortion services from participating in the Medi-
caid program.224  This provision went into effect on May 10, 2011, and 
Indiana subsequently submitted a SPA to CMS.225  CMS disapproved 
the SPA on June 1, 2011, explaining that the CMS Administrator was 
“unable to approve” the defunding provision amendment because the 
Indiana law violated the Medicaid Act’s “freedom of choice”226 provi-
sion.227  Despite CMS’ disapproval, Indiana continued to enforce the 
provision, and CMS did not withhold FFP from Indiana.  Instead, 
 
 220. See, e.g., PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 675 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“I would reject petitioner’s statutory claim on the ground that the 
remedy for the State’s failure to comply with the obligations it has agreed to under-
take under the Medicaid Act is set forth in the Act itself: termination of funding by 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, see 42 U.S.C. § 
1396c.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 221. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living 
Ctr. of S. Cal., 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2010) on petition for cert., 2010 WL 4959708, at 
*19.  Note that this statement is inconsistent with subsequent statements made by the 
United States in the Douglas case after the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See 
supra note 165 and accompanying text (noting that the United States opposed a 
nonstatutory private right of action). 
 222. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief of American Medical Association et. al., Douglas 
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 
2012), 2011 WL 3488986, at *5 (“Federal administrative enforcement provisions pro-
vide no viable solution to the access crisis because Congress delegated only limited, 
and draconian, enforcement powers.”). 
 223. No. 1:11-CV-630, 2011 WL 2532921, at *10 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2011). 
 224. IND. CODE § 5-22-17-5.5(b)–(d) (2011). 
 225. “On May 13, 2011, FSSA submitted a Medicaid plan amendment to account 
for the defunding provision—to ‘make changes to Indiana’s State Plan in order to 
conform to Indiana State Law.’” Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 
905. 
 226. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23). 
 227. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 905. 
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CMS and the federal government supported Planned Parenthood’s 
complaint, urging the federal district court to enjoin implementation 
of the Indiana law, which violated the freedom of choice provision of 
the Medicaid Act.228  According to the Statement of Interest Brief 
submitted by the United States in this case, the request for “injunctive 
relief [was] particularly necessary . . . [because] Indiana has expressed 
its view that operating a ‘non-compliant program’ is a ‘lawful option 
for the State under the [Medicaid] statute,’ so long as the State is will-
ing to ‘risk that the Secretary will turn off the funding spigot.’”229  The 
Court ultimately granted injunctive relief. 
Planned Parenthood may be distinguished from Douglas because 
the Indiana law was found to be in violation of the freedom of choice 
provision of the Medicaid Act, not the equal access provision.230  The 
United States’ reason, however, for supporting an alternative mecha-
nism to enforce the Medicaid Act rather than withholding federal 
funds in Planned Parenthood does not seem to turn on the specific 
provision of the Medicaid Act, but rather the need for an effective re-
sponse to a State’s operation of a non-compliant program. 
Although the Supreme Court sent the Douglas case back to the 
Ninth Circuit, the Court strongly suggested that the providers and 
beneficiaries do not have a cause of action under the Supremacy 
Clause.231  Instead, providers and beneficiaries must wait until final 
agency action, which in the case of Douglas took more than 3 years, 
and bring suit under the APA.232  Therefore, withholding all or a ma-
jor portion of federal matching funds seems to be the most immediate 
 
 228. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Planned Parenthood of Ind., 
Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 892 (No. 11-CV-630) (explaining why injunctive relief is both 
necessary and appropriate to prevent a state from continuing to violate the Medicaid 
Act until HHS has the opportunity to formally reject a plan amendment). 
 229. Id. at 21–22. 
 230. See Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 905. 
 231. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.  In providing support for its 
finding that there is no private right of action under the Supremacy Clause, the 
Douglas dissent highlights the fact that the majority “provides a compelling list of 
reasons” to decide that there is no cause of action directly under the Supremacy 
Clause to enforce the equal access provision.  Douglas, 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 
2012 WL 555204, at *10 (Feb. 22, 2012) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
The majority itself provides a compelling list of reasons for such a result: 
“The Medicaid Act commits to the federal agency the power to administer a 
federal program’; ‘the agency is comparatively expert in the statute’s subject 
matter”; “the language of the particular provision at issue here is broad and 
general, suggesting that the agency’s expertise is relevant”; and APA review 
would provide “an authoritative judicial determination.” Id. 
 232. Id. at *5.  
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penalty CMS may impose on states that fail to comply with the feder-
al Medicaid law and regulations, and the only penalty so long as CMS 
has failed to make a final decision.  As noted above, however, CMS 
rarely withholds federal funding because it would have perverse ef-
fects on the very people the remedy is intended to protect.233  As Jus-
tice Ginsburg pointed out during oral argument in the Douglas case, 
loss of federal funds is “a very drastic remedy that is going to hurt the 
people that Medicaid was meant to benefit.”234  Ultimately, the revo-
cation of federal funding would likely result in even lower reim-
bursement rates, meaning that many Medicaid recipients may either 
lose some of the services they currently receive or lose their coverage 
altogether.235  In fact, the federal government has been candid about 
its unwillingness to withhold federal funds because of the “potentially 
detrimental effects” it would have on Medicaid recipients.236  A less 
drastic and more targeted remedy is needed to penalize non-
 
 233. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 52 (1981) (White 
J., dissenting) (“[A] funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to 
the supposed beneficiaries of the Act.”); Mark H Gallant, Federal Remedies for 
Noncompliance by States, 2 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 27:7 (2011) (describing the 
suspension or reduction of payments to states as an “atomic bomb” remedy that is 
rarely used by DHHS); Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 
2341 n.83 (noting that termination of federal funding “would have perverse effects if 
CMS’s goal were to force state to provide more generous—rather than less gener-
ous—coverage; the withdrawal of federal funding would obviously harm the states’ 
capacity to be generous.”). 
 234. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 158, at 5. 
 235. See Brief of Respondents Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital et al., Douglas, 2012 
WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 3288334, at *2 (“This draconian sanction is rarely 
sought, however, because it would lead to a result that is contrary to the primary pur-
pose of the Medicaid Act—i.e., to facilitate the provision of health care services to 
those otherwise unable to obtain them.”). 
 236. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13 n.11, Exeter Mem. Hosp. 
Ass’n v. Belshe, No. 96-693, 943 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Cal. 1996).  
A compliance action, which results in the withholding of FFP, has a poten-
tially detrimental effect on Medicaid recipients and providers. If [CMS] 
were to withhold FFP pursuant to a compliance action, recipients may well 
be deprived of medical assistance because the State may no longer be able 
to provide certain services.  
Id.; cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 165, at *31–*32 (“[I]f 
the State plan does not comply with [Section (30)(A)], the Secretary can also under-
take a compliance action and withhold federal funds. That administrative process 
brings to bear ‘the expertise, uniformity, widespread consultation, and resulting ad-
ministrative guidance that can accompany agency decisionmaking.’” (citing Gonzaga 
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment))).   
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compliant states because withholding federal funds is a draconian en-
forcement mechanism that is hardly ever used.237 
III.  STRENGTHENING CMS’ OVERSIGHT OF STATES’ MEDICAID 
PROVIDER PAYMENT RATES 
As discussed above, the current administrative mechanisms for en-
suring state compliance with the equal access provision are of limited 
value.  States do not wait for CMS approval before implementing rate 
cuts; indeed, sometimes states do not even submit a SPA to CMS 
when making a change to their payment policies.  Although CMS has 
the authority to withhold federal matching dollars when states are out 
of compliance with the Medicaid Act or the equal access provision 
specifically, they rarely do so, viewing it as a draconian remedy.  And, 
without the benefit of the administrative review of the proposed cut, 
it is difficult for CMS to determine if a rate cut will in fact deny Medi-
caid beneficiaries equal access to care.  The backup to the administra-
tive enforcement has heretofore been the courts, with consumers and 
providers seeking judicial review and injunctive relief of rate cuts they 
believed violated the equal access provision.  After the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Douglas, that avenue is now in doubt.238 
Congress, however, could write an explicit private cause of action 
into the Medicaid Act.239  Some argue that a private right of action is 
essential to ensure that states comply with Medicaid’s require-
ments.240  But others have argued that administrative enforcement 
may work better than private litigation because a thorough under-
standing of Medicaid payment policies is needed to determine wheth-
er state rate cuts violate the equal access provision, and courts do not 
have the expertise or resources to determine whether a given reim-
bursement rate reduction will cause Medicaid recipients to lose access 
to needed services.241  Regardless of whether providers and benefi-
 
 237. See Brief of Amici Curiae, AARP et al., 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 
WL 3584753, at *20 (“Termination of federal funding is a draconian remedy, one that 
DHHS rarely uses.”). 
 238. See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 239. See, e.g., Guiltinan, supra note 119, at 1624; McKennan, supra note 149, at 
503. 
 240. Mckennan, supra note 149, at 503–04 (“A private right action encourages pro-
vider participation by creating a mechanism to recoup financial damages incurred as 
a result of accepting patients at below-cost rates. The private cause of action is a safe-
ty net for those contemplating participation in the [Medicaid] program.”). 
 241. See Jost, supra note 168, at 18 (arguing that the judiciary can make only a lim-
ited contribution to setting the rules for governing the health care industry or for re-
solving disputes that arise within it, leaving administrative oversight to carry out the-
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ciaries have standing to bring judicial action challenging state action, 
an effective administrative remedy is needed to ensure expeditious 
review of states’ Medicaid payment policies. 
Although CMS has the authority to enforce federal standards 
against states, it has failed for the most part to use this authority with 
respect to the equal access provision.  Part III proposes policies to 
enhance the oversight of state payment policies and ensure compli-
ance with the equal access provision.  As a first step, CMS should 
clarify that states must secure federal approval before making chang-
es to provider payment policies.  States that implement changes in 
advance of federal approval should be held accountable if their rate 
cuts are ultimately found to violate the equal access provision.  Se-
cond, CMS could provide that where states benchmark their Medi-
caid rate levels to Medicare rate levels, CMS would presume the 
states’ reimbursement rates to be consistent with the equal access 
provision without prior review. 
A. Require and Enforce Prior Approval of Medicaid Rate Cuts 
CMS should amend the Medicaid regulations to explicitly require 
CMS approval before implementation of rate cuts.242  As discussed 
above, CMS’ proposed rule sets forth a framework by which states 
can demonstrate compliance with the equal access provision.243  The 
proposed rule requires that any SPA “that [would] reduce provider 
payment rates or restructure provider payments in circumstance[s] 
when the resulting changes could create access issues” must include 
an access review that is conducted prior to the submission of a SPA 
implementing a rate reduction.244  The proposed rule does not specify 
the consequences of failing to submit a SPA or implementing a rate 
reduction prior to CMS approval of the SPA.  CMS’ final rule should 
clarify that any rate cut or reduction must be accompanied by an ac-
 
se tasks); Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2324 (suggesting 
that a shift of regulatory authority from judicial forums to federal executive forums 
may be good for health care). 
 242. See CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, supra note 181, at 12 (suggest-
ing that Congress “could require that HHS make specific findings of fact regarding 
the effects of rates on access because a state may be permitted either to increase or 
reduce provide payment rates”). 
 243. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Ser-
vices, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26344 (May 6, 2011) (“[W]e are proposing federal guide-
lines to frame alternative approaches for States to demonstrate consistency with the 
access requirement using a standardized, transparent process, rather than setting na-
tionwide standards.”). 
 244. Id. at 26349. 
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cess review.245  Further, CMS should make clear that states may not 
implement provider reimbursement rate cuts until they have com-
plied with the access framework in the rule and received CMS ap-
proval.246 
If a state implements rate cuts in advance of federal approval, it 
should be held accountable if CMS ultimately denies the rate cut 
SPA.  Specifically, federal funding must be withheld if CMS bars the 
rate cut barred. Unlike the current system, which gives the federal 
government discretion to withhold all or some federal funding after a 
state has failed to comply with federal requirements, this rule would 
impose a mandatory and discrete penalty on states that implement 
rate cuts without CMS approval. 
For whatever reason, if states go ahead and implement rate cuts 
before receiving CMS approval, they should be penalized if CMS 
thereafter denies their SPA cutting reimbursement rates.  CMS 
should amend the Medicaid regulations to include a provision that if 
states implement rate cuts prior to receiving CMS approval, states 
risk the loss of FFP for any retroactive payments that they are found 
to owe providers for the time that the disapproved rate cuts were in 
effect.  This penalty imposes a risk that is comparable to the risk 
states face if they implement rate increases prior to receiving CMS 
approval.  If a state increases provider rates prior to CMS approval, 
and CMS subsequently disapproves the rate increase, the state will be 
liable for the full cost of the increased payment.  This scenario rarely 
occurs, however, because states are unwilling to risk the loss of FFP 
for payment increases and therefore wait for federal approval of rate 
increases.  By contrast, the current system does not put states at risk 
of losing FFP if they implement rate cuts before receiving CMS ap-
proval.  Therefore, this new rule would discourage states from im-
plementing rate cuts before receiving CMS approval, as they would 
be liable for 100% of the retroactive reimbursement if CMS ultimate-
ly disapproves the rate reduction. 
For example, hypothetical State A passed legislation that reduced 
hospital provider rates by 10%.  State A implemented the legislation 
on July 1, 2010.  Two months later,247 on September 1, 2010, State A 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. Letter from Rick Pollack, Executive Vice President, American Hospital 
Assoc., to Donald Berwick, Admin., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(June 30, 2011). 
 247. Although regulations require that, when making changes to “advance di-
rective requirements,” amendments must be submitted no later than sixty days from 
the effective date, the regulations do not specify a specific time when all other 
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submitted a SPA to CMS seeking approval for the reduction in hospi-
tal provider rate cuts.  Under Medicaid regulations, CMS has ninety 
days to render a decision on State A’s SPA. But CMS requested addi-
tional information from State A regarding the proposed rate reduc-
tions and State A provided CMS with the additional information on 
December 1, 2010.  CMS notified State A that the SPA had been dis-
approved on February 1, 2011 and State A immediately sought recon-
sideration of the disapproval.  A hearing to reconsider the disapprov-
al of State A’s SPA was scheduled for April 1, 2011 and the 
disapproval was affirmed on September 1, 2011. 
For fourteen months, from July 1, 2010 until September 1, 2011, 
State A had implemented a 10% rate reduction despite the fact that 
CMS never approved their SPA.  Prior to this reduction State A paid 
approximately $200 million a month for hospital payments.248  With a 
10% reduction, State A paid approximately $20 million less than it 
had previously paid.  This decrease in payment persisted for fourteen 
months before CMS finally affirmed its decision to disapprove State 
A’s SPA.  State A now must reimburse the hospital providers for the 
reduction over the last fourteen months—approximately $280 mil-
lion.  State A normally would have received federal matching funds 
for this payment; however, based on the penalty proposed, State A 
would be required to pay this amount in full.  State A’s FMAP is 
57%, the national average.249  That is, State A would have received 
approximately $160 million from the federal government for this hos-
pital payment, but due to its implementation of the payment reduc-
tion prior to receiving CMS approval, under the proposed approach, 
State A would not receive the $160 million in matching funds from 
the federal government. 
 
amendments must be submitted. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii).  Instead, the regulations 
state “prompt submittal of amendments is necessary (i) so that CMS can determine 
whether the plan continues to meet the requirements for approval and (ii) to ensure 
that availability of FFP in accordance with § 430.20.” 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2)(i)–(ii). 
 248. Although this example is purely hypothetical, these numbers are not unrea-
sonable.  For example, in 2007, Pennsylvania spent approximately $12 billion on 
Medicaid.  About 18.5% of Pennsylvania’s Medicaid spending was on hospital pay-
ments.  That is, Pennsylvania spent approximately $226 million on hospital payments 
per month in 2009. See TOTAL MEDICAID SPENDING, THE URBAN INSTITUTE & 
KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED (2010).  View interactive 
table at statehealthfacts.org. 
 249. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that the average FMAP for 
states is 55%). 
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States are already struggling to find the state funds to reimburse 
providers.250  Losing tens of millions of dollars for failing to follow 
federal regulations should be more than sufficient to incentivize states 
to follow the administrative procedures when enacting significant rate 
reductions.  This Note previously acknowledged the detrimental ef-
fects that withholding federal funds could have on providers and 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  But, unlike the current system, where the 
threat is both too great and too amorphous, under this proposal the 
penalty is mandatory and the amount is limited. 
Finally, a requirement of prior approval imposes an obligation on 
CMS to review proposed rate cuts expeditiously.  Assuming that CMS 
enacts a final rule, expeditious review should be possible since CMS 
has provided states with a “standardized, transparent process” to set 
reimbursement rates in compliance with the equal access provision.251  
In fact, the proposed rule recognizes that CMS has the regulatory au-
thority “to make SPA decisions based on sufficiency of beneficiary 
service access” and that “this proposed rule merely provides a more 
consistent and transparent way to gather and analyze the necessary 
information to support such reviews.”252  If this new rule, in fact, pro-
vides states with a process for determining access, then CMS should 
be able to make determinations on state SPAs that cut reimburse-
ment rates rather expeditiously and states should not have to wait 
months (or years) for CMS to make a determination on their rate 
cuts. 
B. Benchmark Medicaid Rates to Medicare 
An alternate approach by which states could comply with the equal 
access provision would be to benchmark Medicaid rates to Medicare 
rate levels.253  This option would relieve states of the obligation to 
conduct an access review and enable the expeditious implementation 
of rate cuts. 
In opposing CMS’ proposed rule, many states have argued that the 
access review process proposed by CMS imposes “extremely burden-
 
 250. See, e.g., Melissa Westphal, Illinois Has Area Hospitals Playing ‘Balancing 
Game’ with Late Money, ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www. 
rrstar.com/news/x1872805880/Illinois-has-area-hospitals-playing-balancing-game (“Il-
linois is far behind in paying bills owed to health care providers.”). 
 251. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Ser-
vices, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26344 (May 6, 2011).  
 252. Id.  
 253. Mckennan, supra note 149, at 505.  
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some . . . data collection obligations on states as a precondition to 
demonstrating compliance with the vague rate-setting standards.”254  
The States argue that the effort to conduct a study like the access 
study required in the proposed rule “would be nothing short of Her-
culean.”255  The states also contend that the requirements under the 
proposed rule “would leave states in a state of perpetual uncertainty . 
. . of their provider reimbursement rates.”256  Allowing states to set 
their Medicaid rates based on federal standards would relieve states 
of the responsibility to conduct a costly access study, and would pro-
vide states with the certainty that their rates are compliant with fed-
eral requirements. 
Linking Medicaid rates to Medicare rates is not a radical solution 
to the problem of unreasonably low Medicaid rates.  As discussed 
above, based on Section (30)(A)’s requirement that state payment 
policies are consistent with efficiency and economy, states cannot set 
reimbursement rates that exceed the UPL.257  “[The] UPL [is] calcu-
lated based on what could reasonably be estimated would . . . be paid 
under Medicare payment principles to an entire class of providers.”258  
In addition, the ACA includes a provision, often referred to as the 
“PCP bump,” which requires state Medicaid agencies to increase pri-
mary care provider (PCP) reimbursement rates to reach parity with 
Medicare rates in 2013 and 2014.259  By benchmarking Medicaid rates 
to Medicare, the PCP bump “enables Medicaid programs to sustain 
and potentially expand its primary care network . . . and creates a crit-
ical opportunity to drive improvements in primary care access and 
quality.”260 
Similar to the UPL and the ACA’s PCP bump provision, states 
may opt-in to set rates based on federal standards benchmarked at 
Medicare rates.  By giving states this option, states can decide to re-
tain flexibility in designing payment methodologies or decide to set 
rates based on federal standards.  This alternative option would allow 
states to avoid penalties for setting rates not in compliance with fed-
 
 254. Joint Comments of 17 States and State Medicaid Agencies at 2 (July 5, 2011), 
in response to Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342 (May 6, 2011).  
 255. Id. at 3. 
 256. Id. at 4. 
 257. See BACHRACH, supra note 114, at 7 and accompanying text.  
 258. See SCHNEIDER & ROUSSEAU, supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 259. See MCGINNIS, BERENSON & HIGHSMITH, supra note 93, at 1.   
 260. See id. at 2.  
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eral rules and relieve states having to comply with the “burdensome” 
access review process.261 
CONCLUSION 
The Medicaid law vests CMS with the responsibility and authority 
to review state payment policies to ensure compliance with the equal 
access provision; it also establishes a SPA review process to effectuate 
CMS oversight of state Medicaid programs.  Due both to the lack of 
financial incentives for states to comply with the SPA process and the 
perverse effects of a federal compliance action—withholding federal 
matching dollars—the federal government lacks effective tools to en-
sure compliance with the equal access provision.  In short, the current 
administrative remedies for non-compliance are without teeth.  This 
Note proposes two approaches whereby CMS could facilitate state 
compliance with the equal access provision and penalize non-
compliance.  States that implement changes in advance of federal 
SPA approval would be held accountable if their rate cuts are ulti-
mately found to violate the equal access provision.  In addition, states 
that benchmark their Medicaid rate levels to Medicare rates would be 
presumed to be in compliance with the equal access provision.  These 
policy changes will not only streamline the state rate-setting process, 
but will also give the federal government the tools to provide effec-
tive oversight of state payment policies. 
Enforcement of the equal access provision is central to Medicaid’s 
goal of providing low-income Americans with meaningful access to 
needed medical care.  Tens of millions of people rely on Medicaid for 
their health insurance.  Without access to services that coverage is 
meaningless.  If states are permitted to disregard the equal access 
provision with impunity, not only will violations of federal law go un-
checked, but millions of Americans will be without adequate access to 
needed medical services.  The lack of access puts them at unnecessary 
risk of harm or even death.  For all these reasons, CMS must adopt 
procedures to ensure that state Medicaid payment policies enable 
Medicaid beneficiaries to access medical services to the same extent 
as the general population in their communities. 
 
 261. See Joint Comments of 17 States and State Medicaid Agencies, supra note 
254, at 2. (“[T]he Commenting States are deeply concerned that the access review 
process proposed by CMS fails to advance those objectives, instead subjecting states 
to unnecessarily burdensome requirements . . . .”). 
